Miah, R (On the Application Of) v The Independent Police Complaints Commission

In a police complaints appeal concerning a Schedule 7 stop, the complainant is entitled to adequate reasons and information about the investigation, but not necessarily to the positive intelligence or security reasons for the stop. Where disclosure is withheld on national-security grounds, the statutory scheme assigns the initial judgment to the appropriate authority and the IPCC on appeal. Judicial review is concerned with the lawfulness of the IPCC’s opinion that non-disclosure was necessary. In the absence of a sensible evidential basis for alleging discriminatory, improper, bad-faith, arbitrary or capricious conduct, the court need not review the closed reasons and need not order closed-material proceedings.

The claimant, a British Asian Muslim, was stopped and examined at Heathrow under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. He complained that the stop was racially or religiously discriminatory. The police investigation did not uphold the complaint, and the IPCC dismissed his appeal after reviewing security-sensitive background material under an agreement with the Metropolitan Police Service.

In judicial review proceedings, the claimant alleged inadequate reasons and information, a blanket policy against disclosure, and irrationality. A preliminary issue was whether the claim could be dismissed without disclosure of the reasons for the stop or closed-material review.

1. Statutory role and reasons. The IPCC acts in a quasi-judicial capacity on a complaint appeal, but the complainant is a participant in an investigatory and disciplinary process, not a full party to civil litigation. Reasons must explain in broad terms why an adverse decision was reached, but their adequacy depends on the circumstances. The IPCC also had an express duty to give reasons under regulation 10(7) of the Police (Complaints and Misconduct) Regulations 2004.
2. Schedule 7 information. Parliament did not make the exercise of Schedule 7 powers dependent on reasonable suspicion and did not give a stopped person a right to know the positive information supporting the stop. A complaint may nevertheless allege that a stop was arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory. The investigation must examine whether there is an evidential basis for that allegation. If diligent investigation finds no such basis, the statutory scheme does not require disclosure of a positive lawful reason for the stop.
3. National-security non-disclosure. The word “necessary” in the statutory disclosure scheme has a high but relative threshold. It means more than useful or expedient, and requires judgment on the material factors, including the benefits of disclosure and the protection of national security. Regulation 12 assigns that judgment first to the appropriate authority and, on appeal, to the IPCC. The IPCC’s decision is reviewable for lawfulness, but the court was not obliged to inspect the closed material merely because the claimant sought to challenge the adequacy of the reasons.
4. Application and disposition. The IPCC had considered the relevant guidance, applied the correct legal test, and had not adopted a blanket ban on disclosure. There was no sensible evidential basis for alleging discriminatory or otherwise improper conduct. The reasons supplied were adequate, no further gist was required, and none of the four grounds succeeded. The preliminary question was answered “Yes”, and the judicial review was dismissed without closed-material proceedings.