Y children (Findings of Fact as to Radicalisation) Part 1, Re

In care proceedings involving alleged radicalisation, the court must distinguish between lawful religious or political belief and conduct or influence causing, or risking, significant harm to children. The relevant question is the effect of the environment and exposure on the children, including secrecy, isolation, harmful attitudes, defiance of the law and risk of violence. Exposure to extremist organisations, inflammatory speeches, violent imagery and related symbols may form part of a cumulative pattern of harm. A fact-finding court should dismiss an allegation at an early stage only where the evidence could not properly support it; where a prima facie case exists, conflicting explanations should be assessed on the totality of the evidence.

The local authority brought wardship and care proceedings concerning three children living with their father. It alleged inadequate education, association with a proscribed organisation, exposure to extremist beliefs and material, radicalisation, and a planned journey to Syria. The judgment concerned a discrete fact-finding hearing. The court considered whether the father had exposed the children to harmful beliefs, speeches, images and activities, and whether the alleged journey could be determined before evidence from other family members was heard.

1. Preliminary approach. The court was required to apply the significant-harm framework under Children Act 1989, s 31, while respecting freedom of thought, religion and expression. Religious or political views, even controversial ones, do not automatically justify intervention. The focus is on the effect on the children and any risk of harm.
2. An allegation should be dismissed at an initial stage only where the evidence discloses nothing capable of supporting it. Here, the evidence established a prima facie case that the proposed journey to Syria was not for an innocent purpose. The issue could not fairly be decided before the adult children gave evidence, because responsibility for the proposed journey and the father's knowledge were intertwined.
3. The father was closely associated with Al Muhajiroun and had exposed the children to demonstrations, meetings and speeches connected with it. The court found that the children had been exposed to harmful and inflammatory views, including views supporting violence, rejection of secular law and travel to the Islamic State. The father's attendance with the younger children at a meeting featuring radical speeches was deliberate and amounted to a serious failure to protect them from the likely effect of that material.
4. The court found that photographs, gestures, weapons and related imagery formed part of a pattern encouraging the children to identify themselves as political or religious warriors. In context, this was properly described as grooming or indoctrination. The court also found that the father failed to protect the children from gruesome and extremist images accessible within the family home.
5. The court accepted the expert evidence that the family had experienced a substantial radicalising influence over many years. The findings were cumulative. They included harmful attitudes towards other groups, secrecy and dissembling, isolation from mainstream society, and the risk of involvement in violence.
6. The court made no final decision on disposal. It recognised the children's developing autonomy and observed, in accordance with the Gillick case, that maturity and self-determination are matters of degree. Further evidence was required before deciding whether intervention or removal from the father's care would be necessary.