Ramasmy v The Law Society

An application to withdraw an intervention is concerned with whether the intervention should continue, not with reopening the original decision or finally determining dishonesty. The court must weigh the risks of reinstating the solicitor against the potentially serious consequences of continuing the intervention, having regard to the Law Society’s regulatory assessment.

In assessing suspected dishonesty, the relevant inquiry is whether the conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and whether the solicitor realised that it was dishonest. The court may consider evidence arising after the intervention. Repeated professional errors may be insufficient, but suspected dishonesty, prohibited involvement of a struck-off solicitor in practice, and management or employment concerns may cumulatively justify continuation of an intervention.

The claimant, a sole-practising solicitor, applied under paragraph 6(4) of Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974 for withdrawal of the Law Society’s intervention into her practice. The intervention followed concerns about VAT claims, suspected dishonesty, the involvement of a struck-off solicitor in the practice, and possible breaches of regulatory rules.

The claimant argued that the evidence was insufficient and that some matters amounted at most to professional negligence. The Law Society relied on later evidence and sought to maintain the intervention. The central issue was whether the intervention should then be withdrawn.

1. Application refused. The intervention was maintained.
2. The court’s task under paragraph 6(4) of Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974 was to decide whether the notice should now be withdrawn. The intervention challenge was not frozen at the date of the original resolution. The court therefore considered the evidence available at the hearing and the Law Society’s continuing concerns.
3. The court adopted the dishonesty approach described in Bryant v Law Society [2007] EWHC 3043 (Admin): whether the conduct was dishonest by the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people and whether the solicitor realised that it was dishonest. The documents supplied clear and cogent grounds for suspecting dishonesty in relation to the VAT claims, the court attendance fee, and the denials concerning the struck-off solicitor’s use of the firm’s email account and client files.
4. The isolated error concerning claims vested in a bankrupt’s trustee was negligent, but did not amount to gross negligence or justify disciplinary proceedings. It could not be transformed into an intervention matter merely because other, more serious allegations existed.
5. The evidence provided good reason to believe that the struck-off solicitor had performed prohibited services for the firm, had been involved in its management, and had been employed or remunerated without the required authorisation. These matters engaged section 41 of the Solicitors Act 1974, the restrictions on carrying on reserved legal activities under the Legal Services Act 2007, and the relevant SRA rules.
6. Following Sheikh v Law Society [2007] 3 All ER 183, the court weighed the risks of reinstatement against the potentially catastrophic consequences of continuing the intervention, while taking account of the Law Society’s regulatory view. The seriousness and breadth of the concerns justified continuation.