Chukwuma, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Interim relief should not ordinarily be granted against a person or body that is not a party to the proceedings and has had no proper opportunity to consider and answer the application. That principle applies to a local authority and, with somewhat less force, to another government department. The court should also avoid interfering with arrangements made independently by an educational institution where that institution is not before the court. Where an applicant’s immigration status and entitlement to asylum support are unclear, the appropriate course may be to identify the uncertainty and invite the responsible authority to reconsider its decision or provide clear documentation, rather than grant relief against non-parties.

The claimant, who had previously obtained permission to pursue judicial review concerning the refusal of his asylum application, sought urgent interim relief. A consent order had recorded the Secretary of State’s agreement to reconsider that refusal. The claimant later applied for support under section 95 of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1999, but the application was refused on the understanding that his asylum claim had been determined.

He sought orders requiring Croydon Council to accommodate him, the Department for Work and Pensions to provide Jobseeker’s Allowance, and King’s College to assist with access to a bursary. The central issues were whether relief could properly be granted against those bodies, which were not parties, and whether the refusal of support may have resulted from a misunderstanding of the effect of the agreement to reconsider.

1. The application for interim relief was refused. The claimant sought orders against Croydon Council, the Department for Work and Pensions, and King’s College, but none was a party to the proceedings. The court would not grant interim relief against a third party that was absent, unrepresented and had not been given a proper opportunity to consider the position. This applied particularly to Croydon Council. The same principle applied, with lesser force, to the Department for Work and Pensions.

2. The court adopted the reasoning of Cheema-Grubb J concerning the undesirability of interfering with King’s College’s bursary arrangements. The court should not regulate an independent institution’s arrangements in proceedings to which it was not a party.

3. The court identified an arguable uncertainty concerning the meaning and effect of the letter refusing section 95 support. The letter did not address the Secretary of State’s earlier agreement to reconsider the asylum refusal. If the asylum claim had not finally been determined because reconsideration remained outstanding, the claimant might still fall within the statutory definition of an asylum seeker and the refusal of section 95 support might require reconsideration. If asylum had been refused or granted after reconsideration, the claimant should receive clear written documentation recording that fact.

4. In the circumstances, the most appropriate assistance the court could provide was to set out those observations for the claimant to place before the Secretary of State. The court endorsed the earlier order, including the shortened period for filing acknowledgment of service and grounds of resistance, and directed that the transcript be expedited. The transcript was to be provided at public expense.