Sparrow v Andre

A driver reversing in a car park is not negligent merely because the vehicle is travelling at a moderate speed. The essential obligation is to keep a proper look-out. A defendant whose breach satisfies the but for test remains liable where the ensuing events and injury are reasonably foreseeable, unless the claimant’s conduct constitutes a novus actus interveniens. The question is one of legal responsibility and fairness, assessed in context. A claimant’s negligent contribution does not necessarily break the causal chain. Where the claimant’s conduct is secondary to the defendant’s primary breach, the appropriate consequence may be a reduction for contributory negligence under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, rather than complete exoneration of the defendant.

The claimant sustained catastrophic leg injuries after his car, following a collision with the defendant’s reversing vehicle in a crowded car park, rolled down a slope and crushed his leg against a gate post. The claimant alleged that the defendant had reversed into his stationary car. The defendant alleged that the claimant had reversed into him and had caused the subsequent movement by leaving his automatic vehicle unsecured.

The trial concerned preliminary issues of breach of duty and causation, including whether the claimant’s conduct broke the causal chain and, if not, whether it amounted to contributory negligence.

1. Breach. The defendant conceded that he breached his duty of care by failing to keep a proper look-out while reversing into the claimant’s vehicle. Reversing at 6 to 10 mph in a car park was not, by itself, negligent; the breach lay in the failure to observe the claimant’s car and avoid the collision.
2. Causation. The collision was a factual cause of the whole sequence. Without it, the claimant’s car would not have been left at the dangerous position, the claimant would not have exited to inspect the damage, the car would not have rolled down the slope, and the claimant would not have attempted to stop it. The court applied the ordinary but for test, while recognising that factual causation does not alone determine legal responsibility.
3. Remoteness and intervening conduct. Applying the principles in Simmons v British Steel Plc [2004] UKHL 20, the court held that personal injury to an occupant and damage to a vehicle were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the breach. The claimant’s failure to secure the car and his attempt to stop it did not constitute a novus actus interveniens. The conduct occurred in the immediate context of the defendant’s breach and the claimant’s reasonable fear for his children. In accordance with the fairness-based approach discussed in McKew v Holland and Hannen and Cubitts (Scotland) Ltd [1969] 3 All ER 1621 HL and Spencer v Wincanton Holdings [2009] EWCA Civ 1404, the defendant fairly and reasonably remained liable for the entire incident.
4. Contributory negligence. The claimant had failed to engage Park mode, apply the foot brake or switch off the ignition. That failure was a material cause of the injury. The claimant’s conduct was not wholly unreasonable in the exceptional circumstances, but it warranted a reduction in damages under section 1 of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.
5. Outcome. The defendant was liable for the claimant’s injury, subject to a 60 per cent reduction for contributory negligence.