Majit, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A generic interim injunction cannot ordinarily be granted in judicial review proceedings for the benefit of unidentified persons who are not parties. Such relief requires consent or a recognised exception permitting proceedings on behalf of others. A defined group facing imminent removal may justify exceptional relief, but that does not establish a general jurisdiction to protect all persons in a similar position. Where an individual can obtain an automatic suspension of removal by commencing judicial review, the balance of convenience will ordinarily provide no basis for generic injunctive relief. The existence of a pending test case and other grants of permission does not, by itself, justify such an order.

The claimant sought a generic interim injunction preventing Dublin III returns to Bulgaria pending judgment in the test case of Khaled v Secretary of State for the Home Department. The proposed order would have protected other persons, including persons who had made no application to the court, unless they consented to removal.

The application relied principally on an earlier Court of Appeal order extending interim relief to other identifiable persons due to be removed on a particular flight. The issues were whether the court had jurisdiction to grant relief for persons unknown, whether statutory provisions prevented or required it, and whether relief was justified as a matter of discretion.

1. Application refused. The claimant already had permission to seek judicial review and a stay of his own removal. The proposed injunction was therefore directed principally to persons who were not parties to the proceedings.
2. Proceedings cannot generally be conducted on behalf of individuals without their consent. Recognised exceptions include the Attorney General’s public-interest role, certain representative proceedings by non-governmental organisations, and statutory opt-out collective actions. None applied because the claimant had advanced his private interest and had not established a proper basis for piggy-backing the proposed relief on his claim.
3. The court considered section 31(2A) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The reference to relief included injunctive relief. The court found no exceptional public-interest reason to disregard the statutory restriction in section 31(2B).
4. The earlier decision in HN (Afghanistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department was distinguishable. It concerned a clearly identifiable group of people on a particular flight, facing an imminent removal deadline, so that some might be unable to apply for relief in time. Those features were absent here.
5. There was no evidence that persons facing removal to Bulgaria could not access the court or the Upper Tribunal. Under the established procedure recognised in Pharis, making an application for judicial review automatically suspended removal. That procedure adequately addressed the balance of convenience and meant that generic relief was unnecessary.
6. The Secretary of State was awarded costs of £800.