Cardiff County Council v BI & Ors [2016 EWHC 887 (Fam) (23 March 2015)

In care and adoption proceedings, the local authority must prove the threshold criteria on the balance of probabilities. Findings must be based on evidence and proper inferences, not suspicion or speculation. A lie has no automatic significance; the court must consider why it was told and its relevance to the risk of harm.

Adoption is a draconian order and may be made only where it is required by the child’s welfare and nothing else will do. The court must evaluate all realistically available options holistically, comparing their advantages, disadvantages and risks. Delay cannot be justified in the hope of future parental change outside the child’s timescale.

Cardiff County Council sought care and placement orders concerning EB, a six-month-old child. EB had been left in Cardiff by his mother with a man who initially claimed to be the father and his partner, after the mother had known them for only a short time. DNA testing established that the man was not the father. EB’s putative father in Spain did not participate.

The mother opposed the applications. The issues were whether the threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 was established, whether a final care order was required, and whether EB’s welfare required parental consent to adoption to be dispensed with and a placement order made.

1. Threshold and proof. The local authority bore the burden of proof. The applicable standard was the balance of probabilities. The seriousness of an allegation did not alter that standard, although inherent probabilities could be relevant when deciding where the truth lay. Findings had to rest on evidence and proper inferences, not suspicion or speculation.
2. Lies. A finding that a witness had lied on one issue did not establish that the witness had lied on another. The court had to consider whether there was an innocent explanation and, if not, what relevance the lie had to overall truthfulness and the allegations in issue.
3. Threshold established. The mother’s decision to leave a three-week-old baby with virtual strangers and to agree that they would care for him permanently placed EB at risk of significant harm. That conduct, combined with the mother’s chaotic lifestyle, unsafe relationships, dishonesty, poor care of M, criminal involvement and inconsistent contact, made the statutory threshold under section 31(2) of the Children Act 1989 satisfied.
4. Care order. A return to the mother was not safe. Although change might eventually be possible, the necessary changes would take longer than EB’s timescale. The court could not leave EB’s future uncertain in the hope that the mother might later develop safe and stable parenting.
5. Placement order. Adoption required paramount consideration to EB’s welfare throughout his life. The court considered the statutory checklist and the whole range of available options. Long-term fostering would preserve family links but would leave EB without the permanence and security he required. The options were assessed holistically, including the risks of delay and the absence of meaningful relationships with other relatives. The court concluded that nothing else would do, made a placement order, dispensed with the mother’s consent under section 52(1) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, and approved the care plan subject to correction of an error concerning developmental delay.