Marzan v RSPCA

On an appeal by case stated, the High Court may interfere with factual findings only where they disclose an error of law. That includes a finding unsupported by evidence or a conclusion which no reasonable tribunal, properly applying its mind to the evidence, could have reached. The court cannot substitute its own assessment of the evidence merely because it would have reached a different conclusion.

For entry under section 17(1)(e) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, the officer must genuinely and reasonably believe that entry is necessary to save life or limb or prevent serious damage to property. Whether that belief was genuinely held and reasonably based is ordinarily a question of fact for the trial tribunal.

Mr and Mrs Mazan were convicted at Bradford Magistrates’ Court of offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006. Their appeals to Bradford Crown Court were largely dismissed, although their sentences were reduced. The prosecution evidence included material obtained when a police officer forced entry to their home under section 17(1)(e) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The Crown Court found that the officer genuinely believed that the dogs were at imminent risk of death and that her belief was based on reasonable grounds. The appellants appealed by case stated, challenging the lawfulness of the entry and the Crown Court’s findings. The central issue was whether those findings disclosed an error of law within the limited jurisdiction of the High Court.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Crown Court had applied the correct legal test. Entry under section 17(1)(e) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was lawful if the officer genuinely and reasonably believed that entry was necessary to avert a risk of serious damage to property, including the imminent death of one or more dogs.
2. The officer’s genuine belief and the reasonableness of its grounds were questions of fact and degree for the tribunal which heard the evidence. The High Court’s jurisdiction on an appeal by case stated under section 28 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 did not permit a rehearing or reassessment of evidential weight.
3. A factual finding may amount to an error of law where it is unsupported by evidence or rests on a view of the evidence which no reasonable tribunal could adopt. These are high thresholds. The fact that the High Court might have reached a different conclusion is insufficient.
4. Although the judge had grave doubts about the accuracy of the police officer’s evidence concerning an overwhelming odour and the risk of dead dogs, the Crown Court had heard and tested that evidence in cross-examination. There was evidence capable of supporting its findings, and those findings could not be characterised as ones which no reasonable fact-finding tribunal could have reached.
5. The respondent’s costs were ordered to be paid from Central Funds under section 17 of the Prosecution of Offences Act. The appellants were bailed to attend Bradford Crown Court on 30 March.

• Bradford Magistrates’ Court: convicted the appellants of offences under the Animal Welfare Act 2006 and imposed concurrent terms of imprisonment.
• Bradford Crown Court: on rehearing, largely dismissed the appeals against conviction, varied the sentences, and held that the police entry and search were lawful.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal by case stated.