Tanveer v East London Bus and Coach Co Ltd

For calculating a period expressed as one calendar month after a specified event, the corresponding date principle applies unless a recognised exceptional case requires otherwise. The period ends on the day of the subsequent month bearing the same number as the day on which the event occurred. The principle applies whether the legislation uses “after” or “from”, and whether the period is one month or several months. Section 207B(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 therefore extended the time limit to the corresponding date, not the last day of the calendar month. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was bound by Dodds v Walker and dismissed the appeal.

The claimant appealed from a decision of the East London Employment Tribunal concerning the time limit for an unfair dismissal claim. His employment ended on 20 March 2015. An ACAS early conciliation certificate was issued on 30 June 2015, and the claim was presented on 31 July 2015.

The Employment Tribunal held that the claim was presented one day out of time. It extended time for the disability discrimination claim on a just and equitable basis, but found that it had been reasonably practicable to present the unfair dismissal claim in time. The appeal concerned only the construction of section 207B(4) of the Employment Rights Act 1996: whether “one month after” 30 June expired on 30 July or 31 July.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Employment Tribunal correctly held that the unfair dismissal claim was presented out of time.
2. Section 207B of the Employment Rights Act 1996 stops the limitation clock during the relevant early conciliation period and, where the unextended time limit would expire between Day A and one month after Day B, extends the time limit under section 207B(4).
3. The parties accepted that “month” meant calendar month. The question was how to calculate “one month after” Day B. The corresponding date principle provides that a period of one month after a specified event ends on the day in the following month bearing the same number as the day of the event.
4. That principle applies to a period expressed as one month after an event, notwithstanding the use of “after” rather than “from”. Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 1027 HL expressly addressed a month or months and did not support an exception merely because section 207B(4) involved a single month.
5. The principle was clear, simple and binding on the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Day B was 30 June 2015, so the extended period ended on 30 July 2015. The claim presented on 31 July was out of time.
6. The claimant did not pursue the alternative perversity ground or challenge the refusal to amend the ET1.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: dismissed the appeal from the East London Employment Tribunal.
• East London Employment Tribunal: held that the unfair dismissal claim was one day out of time; extended time for the disability discrimination claim on a just and equitable basis, but refused an extension for the unfair dismissal claim.