Harron v Dorset Police (Disability Discrimination)

A claimant who proves that an impairment has lasted at least 12 months satisfies the long-term limb of disability. The tribunal need not retrospectively identify the earlier date when its continuation first appeared likely. However, the claimant must prove a substantial adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities; an impairment or an explained absence of disclosure does not itself supply that evidence.

For philosophical belief, the Grainger criteria remain applicable. They must be applied with the modest threshold explained in Williamson, without setting the bar so high that minority beliefs lose protection. A belief confined to a narrow workplace context may be too parochial rather than fundamental, but that is an evaluative question and not an automatic exclusion.

The claimant, employed by Dorset Police, alleged disability discrimination and discrimination because of his asserted belief in the proper and efficient use of public money in the public sector.

At a preliminary hearing, the Employment Tribunal held that he was disabled only from 28 May 2013. It found insufficient evidence that his bipolar disorder, obsessive compulsive disorder and stress had previously caused the required substantial adverse effect. It also held that his asserted belief was not a protected philosophical belief under the Equality Act 2010.

He appealed both rulings. The central issues were whether the Tribunal had wrongly approached the date of disability and whether it had applied the correct threshold and given adequate reasons when rejecting the asserted belief.

1. Appeal allowed in part. The appeal against the disability ruling was dismissed. The appeal against the philosophical-belief ruling was allowed and remitted to the same Employment Judge for a fresh decision.

2. Under section 6(1) of the Equality Act 2010, an impairment must have a substantial and long-term adverse effect on normal day-to-day activities. Where the effect has in fact lasted at least 12 months, paragraph 2(1)(a) of Schedule 1 supplies an independent route to long-term status. It is unnecessary to ask when, viewed prospectively, the condition first appeared likely to last that long. The prospective assessment in McDougall concerns likelihood of recurrence or a condition that has not yet lasted 12 months.

3. The Tribunal's wording improperly suggested attention to the employer's knowledge, which was irrelevant to the preliminary issue of when disability began. Nevertheless, its essential finding was one of fact: there was no cogent medical or factual evidence of a substantial adverse effect before 28 May 2013. That finding was open to it. Reluctance by people with mental impairments to disclose them may explain missing evidence, but cannot itself become positive evidence of the statutory functional effect.

4. The Grainger criteria, reflected in the statutory Code, remained the appropriate framework for philosophical belief and were compatible with Article 9. But the Tribunal had to apply them through the approach in Williamson: the belief need be more than trivial, serious and intelligible, while the threshold must not be set so high as to deprive minority beliefs of protection.

5. The Tribunal gave inadequate reasons for finding that the belief failed the second, third and fourth Grainger criteria. It did not explain what made the belief insufficiently weighty, serious or coherent, nor why it was merely a set of values or workplace objective. A belief's narrow workplace focus could be relevant because an unduly parochial belief may lack the required fundamental character; it was not, however, a free-standing exclusion. The issue was remitted to the same Judge, who could be expected to reconsider it professionally in light of Grainger and Williamson.

• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Allowed the appeal concerning philosophical belief and remitted it to the same Employment Judge. Dismissed the appeal concerning disability.
• Employment Tribunal: At a preliminary hearing, held that the claimant was disabled from 28 May 2013 and that his asserted belief did not qualify for protection under the Equality Act 2010.