G v The First-tier Tribunal

A conviction retrospectively rendered spent under the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 must be treated as spent for the purposes of a criminal injuries compensation scheme. Section 4(1) applies the statutory protection for rehabilitated persons to all legal purposes, including tribunal proceedings, unless a relevant exception applies.

Accordingly, a tribunal may not reduce an award for character by relying on convictions which the amended rehabilitation regime requires it to treat as spent. In judicial review proceedings, the Upper Tribunal may substitute its own decision only where the decision is quashed for error of law and only one lawful decision was possible.

G was the victim of a violent assault in 2003 and applied for compensation under the 2001 criminal injuries compensation scheme. The Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority accepted that he was entitled to an award, but contended that it should be reduced because of criminal convictions.

On 14 October 2014 the First-tier Tribunal reduced the award by 25% under paragraph 13(e) of the scheme. G sought judicial review. By then, amendments to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, brought into force on 10 March 2014, had changed the rehabilitation periods and applied retrospectively. The Authority supported the claim, accepting that all of G's convictions were spent when the tribunal decided the case.

The central issue was whether those retrospectively spent convictions could lawfully be used to reduce the award for character.

1. Judicial review allowed. The First-tier Tribunal's decision was quashed for error of law. Its 25% reduction relied on convictions which it was required to treat as spent.

2. Section 141 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 gave the relevant amendments to the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 retrospective effect. On and after 10 March 2014, a conviction rendered spent by those amendments had to be treated as if it had always been spent. The parties agreed that the pre-application convictions would have been spent under the amended regime, and that the later convictions were spent when the First-tier Tribunal decided the case.

3. Section 4(1) of the 1974 Act required a rehabilitated person to be treated for all legal purposes as if the spent conviction and underlying offending had not occurred. Its exclusion of evidence of spent convictions applied in proceedings before a tribunal by virtue of section 4(6). That protection applied to paragraph 13(e) of the 2001 scheme, so that the scheme's reference to spent convictions varied with the amended Act.

4. The Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 (Exceptions) Order 1975 contained no relevant exception for awards or appeals under the 2001 scheme. The proceedings listed in Schedule 3 concerned recovery provisions under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1995, not the present award.

5. The conditions in section 17(1)(b) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 were met: the decision was quashed for error of law and, absent that error, only one decision was possible. The Upper Tribunal substituted a decision awarding £385,523.55 before any interim-payment deduction, with no reduction under paragraph 13(e). The substituted decision had effect as a First-tier Tribunal decision.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): Allowed G's judicial review claim, quashed the First-tier Tribunal decision for error of law, and substituted a decision under sections 15 and 17 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007.
• First-tier Tribunal: On 14 October 2014, reduced the criminal injuries compensation award by 25% under paragraph 13(e) of the 2001 scheme.