PH v The Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (II)

A finding that a claimant has a disease but was not in an occupation in relation to which it was prescribed is not a finding that the claimant was not suffering from a prescribed disease for regulation 5(2) purposes. It does not therefore bind a later decision-maker as to the existence of the disease.

A finding made to decide whether employment fell within the prescription is not necessarily a determination of the statutory date of onset under regulations 5 and 6. A decision on entitlement must be internally consistent with its findings on symptoms, prescribed employment and onset. A tribunal must also make sufficient findings on functional disability and give adequate reasons for attributing it to a cause other than the prescribed disease.

The claimant appealed against a First-tier Tribunal decision of 14 April 2014 which had confirmed a decision awarding no Industrial Injuries Disablement Benefit because his assessed loss of faculty from carpal tunnel syndrome was 2%.

The Secretary of State had accepted medical advice that the claimant had suffered carpal tunnel syndrome from 1 June 1976, but had treated 1 October 2008 as the date of onset. An earlier tribunal had found that symptoms developed in 2006 when deciding that the claimant's employment was not within the relevant prescription. The issues were whether that earlier finding bound the Secretary of State, whether the onset date was lawful, and whether the tribunal had adequately reasoned its assessment of disablement.

1. Appeal allowed. The First-tier Tribunal's decision contained errors of law and was set aside.

2. Under Social Security Act 1998, section 17, a finding of fact is conclusive only to the extent regulations provide. Regulation 5(2) of the Social Security (Industrial Injuries) (Prescribed Diseases) Regulations 1985 concerns a finding that the claimant was not suffering from the relevant disease. It did not apply where the earlier tribunal found that the claimant had carpal tunnel syndrome but had not been employed in a prescribed occupation when symptoms began.

3. The earlier finding that symptoms developed in 2006 was made to determine whether the disease was prescribed in relation to the claimant. It was not a determination of a statutory date of onset under regulations 5 and 6. It was neither sufficiently specific nor necessary to the earlier tribunal's decision to assess disablement.

4. The Secretary of State could accept the medical evidence that symptoms began on 1 June 1976. However, the decision that the disease was prescribed in relation to the claimant, while assigning 1 October 2008 as the onset date, was fundamentally inconsistent. The tribunal erred by adopting that decision without addressing that inconsistency.

5. The tribunal also failed to identify the claimant's functional disabilities or adequately explain why it attributed them principally to ulnar nerve damage rather than carpal tunnel syndrome. That was a further error of law.

6. Under section 12(2)(b) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, the case was remitted to a differently constituted First-tier Tribunal. Reconsideration was confined to assessment of loss of faculty. The parties agreed that symptoms first arose, and the date of onset was, 1 June 1976.

• Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber): allowed the claimant's appeal, set aside the First-tier Tribunal decision for errors of law, and remitted the assessment issue to a differently constituted tribunal.
• First-tier Tribunal: on 14 April 2014 dismissed the claimant's appeal against the Secretary of State's decision of 25 June 2013.