AS (Iran) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Membership of a particular social group is distinct from whether a claimant faces a real risk of persecution. An error in describing that distinction is immaterial where the tribunal’s factual findings establish no such risk.

Reasons must disclose the governing principles and critical findings, but need not address every argument or evidential item. Low-level, unrecognised political activity and an earlier illegal exit did not establish material error. Under HJ (Iran), discretion engages refugee protection only when materially motivated by fear of persecution. A convert’s historical route to Christianity is not automatically part of religious identity; the analysis may differ where evangelising is a religious duty. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, an Iranian national, appealed against the dismissal of her asylum and humanitarian-protection claims. The First-tier Tribunal, on a remitted rehearing, rejected claims based on domestic violence, Christianity and conversion, illegal exit from Iran, and political activity in the United Kingdom.

The Upper Tribunal dismissed her appeal. The Court of Appeal considered whether the First-tier Tribunal had made material errors of law concerning membership of a particular social group, the risk arising from religion and conversion, and the risk arising from illegal exit and sur-place political activity.

1. Appeal dismissed. The First-tier Tribunal had made an error, or perhaps an error of expression, in treating a woman in Iran who alleged domestic violence as outside a particular social group under Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention 1951. Membership of the group and the existence of a well-founded fear of persecution were separate questions. The error was immaterial because the Tribunal’s factual findings established that the appellant was not at risk of persecution.
2. The applicable standard for reasons was that stated in R (Iran) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982. A tribunal must identify the principles applied and the critical reasons for its conclusion. It need not address every argument, evidential item or factor. The findings that the appellant’s political activity was low-level, unknown to the Iranian authorities and insufficient to create a political profile were adequately reasoned. The Tribunal had not required her to lie about or conceal that activity.
3. The earlier illegal exit, considered with the findings about the appellant’s political profile, did not establish a material error in the assessment of risk on return.
4. Applying the approach in HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] 1 AC 596, discretion engages Convention protection where it is materially motivated by fear of persecution. The appellant had treated her religion as private, had not evangelised or proselytised, and had practised Christianity in Iran between 2009 and 2012 without evidence of persecution. Her unchallenged ability to relocate within Iran further supported the conclusion that she faced no Convention risk.
5. The historical fact that the appellant had converted from Islam was not, on the facts, part of her religious belief or Christian identity. It might be otherwise where a denomination made active evangelising a religious duty, but that issue did not arise on the evidence.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division): dismissed the appeal against the Upper Tribunal’s decision.
2. Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber): Judge Manuell dismissed the appeal on 10 April 2014. Judge Kekic refused permission to appeal on 14 July 2014.
3. First-tier Tribunal: Judge Beg dismissed the remitted appeal on 15 January 2014. Permission to appeal was granted on 3 February 2014.
4. Earlier proceedings: Judge Kanagaratnam dismissed an earlier appeal on 18 March 2013. Upper Tribunal Judge Lewis remitted the matter for a full rehearing on 24 May 2013.