Campbell, R (on the application of) v London Borough of Croydon

Relief obtained on a without-notice application does not, by itself, determine the ultimate costs order. The court must consider the merits after the respondent has had an opportunity to be heard, subject to the ordinary costs rules. An applicant for judicial review must also make full and frank disclosure, including adverse information material to the application. In a homelessness claim, Housing Act 1996, section 188(1) requires facts capable of giving the authority reason to believe that the applicant may have a priority need. A deficient pleaded case, coupled with material non-disclosure, may justify ordering the applicant to pay the respondent’s costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of Croydon’s failure to provide interim accommodation while investigating her homelessness application. On a without-notice application, Dove J ordered Croydon to provide accommodation and reserved costs. The claim later became academic, and HHJ Gore QC refused permission. Mr Lavender QC subsequently ordered Croydon to pay the applicant’s costs, treating the interim relief as sufficient merit to justify that order.

Croydon appealed. The central issues were whether the without-notice order materially determined costs, whether the pleaded case established a basis for interim accommodation under section 188(1) of the Housing Act 1996, and whether the applicant had made proper disclosure.

1. Appeal allowed. The order requiring Croydon to pay the applicant’s costs was set aside. The proper order was that the applicant pay Croydon’s costs.
2. A party affected by an order made without notice is entitled to an opportunity to be heard on the merits before the court determines costs. The fact that interim relief was granted without notice therefore says little about the ultimate costs order. The reservation of costs did not assist the applicant.
3. Under CPR Part 44.10(2), where the court makes an order granting relief sought on a without-notice application and the order does not mention costs, the order is deemed to include an order for the applicant’s costs in the case. Costs in the case ordinarily follow the ultimate result, unless the court orders otherwise.
4. Section 188(1) of the Housing Act 1996 requires the authority to have reason to believe that the applicant may be homeless, eligible for assistance and have a priority need. The pleaded case contained no factual assertion capable of establishing, or supporting a belief in, priority need. It would therefore have failed without a radical amendment.
5. An applicant for judicial review, particularly on a without-notice application, owes a duty of full and frank disclosure. Failure to disclose the housing officer’s warning that the information supplied did not indicate priority need was a serious omission.
6. R (oao M) v Croydon LBC concerned a public authority’s concession that relief was due. It did not govern this case, where Croydon made no such concession.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Croydon’s appeal against the costs order was allowed. The applicant was ordered to pay Croydon’s costs.
• Administrative Court: Dove J granted interim accommodation on a without-notice application and reserved costs. HHJ Gore QC later refused permission because the claim had become academic. Mr Lavender QC ordered Croydon to pay the applicant’s costs.