Younas v R

A sentencing court may not treat ordinary counts as specimen or multiple-incident counts and increase sentence for further, unadmitted offending. Where the prosecution alleges a course of similar offending, the indictment must be framed so that the offender’s admitted criminality can properly be sentenced.

Under Criminal Justice Act 2003, section 225, dangerousness alone does not require life imprisonment. The court must first find that the seriousness of the offence or associated offences justifies life imprisonment. If it does not, the court must consider the statutory conditions for an extended sentence under section 226A.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Reading Crown Court to two counts of raping an eight-year-old child. The indictment alleged two separate rapes on different dates. At sentence, however, the Recorder treated the counts as the first and last incidents in a continuing campaign of rape, found the appellant dangerous, and imposed concurrent life sentences with a six-year minimum term.

The appeal was brought substantially out of time. The Court of Appeal considered whether the Recorder could sentence on the basis of repeated uncharged offending, whether dangerousness automatically required life sentences, and whether the dangerousness finding was justified on the proper factual basis.

1. Appeal allowed. The court granted the necessary extension of time and leave to appeal. The life sentences were quashed because they rested on material sentencing errors.
2. The indictment did not state, or otherwise make clear, that its two counts were specimen or multiple-incident counts. The appellant could therefore not permissibly be sentenced for a repeated campaign of rape which he had neither admitted nor asked the court to take into consideration. The court followed the principle in Canavan [1998] 1 Crim App Rep 79, with the guidance in Hartley [2012] Crim App Rep 7 and A [2015] 2 Crim App Rep (S) 12.
3. The Recorder had wrongly proceeded on the footing that a finding of dangerousness compelled life imprisonment. Under section 225 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, life imprisonment required both dangerousness and seriousness sufficient to justify life. If the latter condition was not met, the court had then to consider an extended sentence under section 226A. That approach was applied from AG’s Reference 27 of 2013 (Burinskas & other appeals) [2014] 2 Crim App Rep (S) 45.
4. The dangerousness finding could not stand because it was influenced by the impermissible assumption of repeated offending. Assessing the appellant on the basis of two rapes separated by months, and applying Lang [2006] 1WLR 2509, the court was not satisfied that he posed a significant risk of serious harm through further specified offences.
5. Neither life nor an extended sentence was available. The court substituted concurrent determinate sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment, after a one-third credit for the early guilty pleas. The second prohibition in the sexual offences prevention order was quashed; the first prohibition, subject to provisos derived from R v Smith and others [2012] 1WLR 1316, and all other Crown Court orders remained in force.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division). Allowed the sentence appeal, quashed the concurrent life sentences, and substituted concurrent terms of 10 years’ imprisonment.
• Reading Crown Court. On 3 March 2014, imposed concurrent life sentences for two counts of rape of a child under 13, with a six-year minimum term, and made a sexual offences prevention order and compensation order.