Beale, R. v

Lifetime anonymity under Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 is automatic but qualified. Its protection does not prohibit reports of separate criminal proceedings in which a complainant is prosecuted for perjury.

An order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 may protect only the administration of justice in the proceedings before the court, or in identified proceedings that are pending or imminent. It cannot impose anonymity to protect the administration of justice generally. The order must address a real risk, its effectiveness, less restrictive measures and proportionality under Article 10(2).

News Group Newspapers Ltd applied under section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 for permission to appeal against a reporting restriction made by His Honour Judge Loraine-Smith QC in the Crown Court at Southwark.

Jemma Beale was then being tried for perjury and attempting to pervert the course of justice. The allegations arose partly from rape allegations she had previously made. The judge ordered that reports of the trial should not identify her, or include material capable of identifying her.

The judge considered that she retained anonymity under the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 and that identification might deter future complainants from reporting sexual offences. The central issues were whether the statutory anonymity applied to the perjury proceedings and whether section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 authorised the restriction.

1. Appeal allowed. The Crown Court order was made without statutory power and was discharged.

2. Section 1(1) of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 gives automatic lifetime anonymity to a person alleging rape or another listed sexual offence. However, section 1(4) expressly qualifies that protection. Perjury proceedings against a rape complainant are criminal proceedings other than the trial, or an appeal from the trial, of the alleged sexual offence. Reporting those proceedings is therefore outside the statutory prohibition.

3. Section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 protects the administration of justice in particular proceedings only. The proceedings must be those then before the court, or other proceedings which are pending or imminent. Applying Horsham Justices, ex parte Farquharson [1982] QB 762, the court held that it does not authorise restrictions to protect the administration of justice generally. Naming Beale posed no substantial risk to the current trial, and no other relevant proceedings were identified.

4. In any event, a restriction must be necessary and proportionate under Article 10(2). The step-by-step approach in R v Sherwood and Others, ex parte Telegraph Group (CA) [2001] 1 WLR 1983 had to be followed. The court must identify a not insubstantial risk of prejudice, determine whether an order would remove it and whether a less restrictive measure would suffice, and then assess the competing public interests. The judge did not undertake that exercise.

5. Section 4(2) permits postponement, not indefinite suppression: see Times Newspapers Limited v R [2007] EWCA Crim 1925. The original order contained no endpoint. General policy concerning the reporting of perjury proceedings was for Parliament, particularly where Parliament had expressly created an exception to anonymity.

6. The court discharged its interim order and made a fresh, agreed section 4(2) order postponing reports of this appeal and judgment until the Southwark jury returned verdicts or was discharged, to prevent prejudice to the ongoing trial.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Allowed News Group Newspapers Ltd's appeal under section 159 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, discharged the Crown Court reporting restriction, and made a limited fresh order postponing reports of the appeal until the jury's verdicts or discharge.
• Crown Court at Southwark: On 5 June 2017, His Honour Judge Loraine-Smith QC made an order under section 4(2) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 preventing identification of the defendant in her ongoing trial.