Fletcher, R v

An appeal based on inconsistent verdicts succeeds only where the appellant shows that the verdicts are not merely inconsistent, but so inconsistent that appellate intervention is required. A jury is not a precision instrument and an appellate court must not usurp its fact-finding role.

Where a complainant's credibility is disputed and the evidence is uncorroborated, acquittals on some counts do not necessarily make convictions on other counts unsafe. Different verdicts may rationally reflect differences in the incidents, the evidence, its detail, or the periods charged. This is particularly so where the jury has been properly directed to consider each count separately.

The appellant was tried at Bradford Crown Court on seven counts of indecent assault contrary to section 15(1) of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 and one count of sexual assault contrary to section 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. All counts concerned the same complainant.

The jury convicted the appellant on Counts 2 and 3, concerning alleged childhood assaults during specified annual periods, and acquitted him on the remaining counts. He appealed against conviction, contending that the mixed verdicts were irreconcilable because the allegations were substantially the same and the complainant's evidence was largely uncorroborated.

The central issue was whether the verdicts were so inconsistent that the convictions were unsafe.

1. Appeal dismissed. The appellant had not established that the convictions on Counts 2 and 3 were unsafe by reason of inconsistency with the acquittals.

2. The governing principles were those set out in Fanning, Kerner, Osianikovas and de Jesus [2016] EWCA Crim 550, confirming Durante [1972] 3 All ER 962. The appellant bore the burden of showing that the verdicts were not merely logically inconsistent, but so inconsistent as to require appellate interference. The court must not treat the jury as a precision instrument or substitute its own assessment for that of jurors who heard the evidence.

3. An acquittal on one allegation does not require the jury to reject the complainant's evidence on every other count. The jury had received an unchallenged and full separate-treatment direction. It was entitled to assess each count individually.

4. The acquittal on Count 8 concerned a separate adult incident, supported and contradicted by different evidence. It did not determine the complainant's credibility in relation to the earlier allegations. Counts 1 and 4 also had identifiable timing differences. The arrival of the goats post-dated Count 1, and Count 4 included a period when the complainant said he was in Cornwall.

5. Although the acquittals on Counts 5 to 7 might appear surprising, the court could not say the verdicts were wholly inexplicable. The evidence gave greater specificity about the alleged incidents at Long Lane, including that they occurred while mucking out, than about the later allegations. The jury could therefore have been sure of the offences charged in Counts 2 and 3 while retaining doubt on the other counts. The convictions were safe.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appellant's appeal against conviction and upheld the convictions on Counts 2 and 3.
• Bradford Crown Court: The jury convicted the appellant on Counts 2 and 3 and acquitted him on the remaining six counts.