Crawford, R v

An advance sentencing indication does not prevent the Attorney General from seeking review for undue leniency under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. An attempted offence will ordinarily merit less than the completed offence because the harm caused is likely to be less, although actual injury remains relevant. Where several offences arise from one short episode, the court must assess their overall seriousness and apply totality. The Court of Appeal will generally not revisit the sentencing judge’s assessment of credit for guilty pleas. A sentence may be increased where it fails properly to reflect deliberate, highly culpable violence and the combined seriousness of the offending.

The Attorney General sought leave to refer, as unduly lenient, sentences imposed at Sheffield Crown Court on Sam Crawford.

After obtaining an advance indication that the overall sentence would not exceed three years, Crawford pleaded guilty to attempting to cause grievous bodily harm with intent, criminal damage, possession of an offensive weapon and assault occasioning actual bodily harm. The Crown Court imposed a total of two years and four months’ imprisonment.

The offences arose when Crawford deliberately drove his car into a group outside a flat, injuring Tara Powell and Shane Johnson and damaging Johnson’s employer’s van. He then struck Johnson with a wheel brace. The central issue was whether the total sentence was unduly lenient and, if so, the proper substituted sentence.

Disposition

1. The court granted leave and allowed the Attorney General’s reference. The total sentence of two years and four months was unduly lenient.

2. An advance indication did not insulate the resulting sentence from review under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Applying R v Goodyear [2005] 2 Cr App R 20, the court held that those advising an offender seeking such an indication should warn that the Attorney General may still seek review.

3. Pre-guideline sentencing comparators will seldom assist where they pre-date the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and modern sentencing guidelines. The court regarded Attorney General’s Reference No 98 of 2002 [2003] EWCA Crim 1018 as factually and methodologically different.

4. The attempted nature of count 1 ordinarily called for a lower sentence than the completed offence, because actual harm will usually be less. That did not reduce the gravity of deliberately driving a car at the victims with intent to cause serious harm. The absence of more serious injury was a matter of chance.

5. The offences formed one short episode. Totality therefore required assessment of the deliberate use of the car as a weapon, the injuries, the vehicle damage and the subsequent wheel-brace attack. Before credit for guilty pleas and allowance for totality, the offending called for at least five years’ imprisonment. The court would not revisit the Crown Court’s 25 per cent credit for the pleas.

6. The court quashed the two-year sentence on count 1 and substituted three years and five months’ imprisonment. The other sentences remained unchanged, producing a total sentence of three years and nine months’ imprisonment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On the Attorney General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court held the total sentence unduly lenient and increased it to three years and nine months’ imprisonment.

• Crown Court at Sheffield: On 18 August 2017, Crawford was sentenced to a total of two years and four months’ imprisonment after guilty pleas to the relevant counts.