Harvey, R v

An acquittal of dangerous driving establishes only that the jury was not sure the driving fell far below the required standard. It does not establish acceptance of the offender’s account of speed or culpability. A sentencing judge may make independent factual findings, provided they do not conflict with or go behind the jury’s verdicts.

Under section 125 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the relevant sentencing guideline must be followed unless doing so would be contrary to the interests of justice. Serious injury to persons in addition to the death may justify a sentence above the guideline starting point despite substantial personal mitigation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to causing death by careless driving, contrary to section 2B of the Road Traffic Act 1988, after his car crossed onto the wrong side of an unlit country road and collided with an oncoming vehicle. One passenger in that vehicle died and several people in both vehicles suffered serious physical and psychological harm.

At the Crown Court at Maidstone, a jury later acquitted the appellant of dangerous-driving allegations. The sentencing judge found that he had been travelling in excess of 70 miles per hour, placed the offence in the most serious guideline category, and imposed two years’ imprisonment with a three-year driving disqualification.

The appeal challenged the guideline category, the factual finding as to speed, and the weight given to mitigation. The central issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence of two years’ imprisonment for causing death by careless driving was not manifestly excessive. The driving disqualification consequently remained unchanged.

2. The jury’s acquittals on the dangerous-driving allegations meant only that it was not sure the appellant’s driving fell far below the standard expected of a competent and careful driver. Those verdicts did not show that the jury accepted his account that he exceeded the speed limit only modestly.

3. The sentencing judge had heard all the evidence and was entitled to make her own findings about speed and culpability, provided they neither conflicted with nor went behind the jury’s verdicts. Her findings that the appellant drove at more than 70 miles per hour and drove irresponsibly were open to her and were consistent with the acquittals.

4. The judge was required by section 125 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to follow the applicable sentencing guideline unless that would be contrary to the interests of justice. She was entitled to place the offence in the category of careless driving falling not far short of dangerous driving and to select a sentence at the top of the guideline range after a trial.

5. The appellant’s remorse, good character, assistance at the scene, mental-health consequences and loss of his military career were substantial mitigation. They had nevertheless to be weighed against the exceptionally serious aggravating feature: one death, very serious injuries to two occupants of the other vehicle, and significant injuries to three further people. The judge took the mitigation into account and adopted the correct sentencing approach.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appellant’s appeal against sentence and upheld the two-year custodial sentence and consequential driving disqualification.

• Crown Court at Maidstone: following the appellant’s guilty plea to causing death by careless driving and jury acquittals on dangerous-driving allegations, imposed two years’ imprisonment and disqualified him from driving for three years on 26 May 2017.