Cook, R. v

Criminal conspiracy requires an agreement between at least two people. A participant need not have met, contacted or known the identity of every other conspirator, but must have joined a scheme involving others.

A jury direction need not use the word knowledge if, read as a whole, it makes clear that the defendant must have agreed with another person to commit the crime and intended that agreement to be carried out. A fresh-evidence ground will fail where the applicant provides no evidence of alleged pressure preventing its use at trial and no reasonable cause for not calling it.

The applicant was convicted by a jury in the Crown Court at Cardiff of conspiracy to defraud arising from an alleged staged motor collision and related insurance claims. She was sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment.

She sought an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal against conviction. Her proposed grounds alleged that the jury had not been properly directed as to the knowledge required for conspiracy and that fresh expert evidence supported the existence of a genuine collision. Her application for leave to appeal against sentence was abandoned during the hearing.

1. The court refused the renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction. The proposed grounds were unarguable. The application for leave to appeal against sentence had been abandoned.

2. The judge’s directions correctly identified the elements of conspiracy. The jury had to be sure that the applicant agreed with at least one person other than her husband that fraud should be committed, and that she intended the agreement to be carried out. A conspirator may join at a different time, at a different level, and in a different role from other participants. The law does not require all conspirators to have met, communicated, known each other’s identities, or known every detail of the plan.

3. The direction sufficiently conveyed that the applicant had to be a party to a common design involving another person. It was unnecessary to add the word knowledge. The direction required the jury first to be sure that the collision was not genuine and then to be sure that the applicant was party to a conspiracy to advance false insurance claims. On the evidence, it was open to the jury to draw the necessary inference. The court therefore rejected the reliance placed on R v Chrastny [1992] 94 Cr App R 283.

4. The fresh-evidence ground had no credible foundation. There was no evidence that the applicant had been prevented by co-accused from calling the expert, no witness statement from her, no application to introduce such evidence, and no indication that the asserted pressure had been raised with the trial judge. No reasonable cause had been shown for not calling the evidence at trial.

5. The explanation for the 19-day delay was wholly without merit. Filing an application for leave to appeal against conviction cannot properly prejudice a defendant at sentence. Although the court could have refused leave without considering the merits for that reason, it considered them and found the proposed appeal unarguable.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): renewed application for leave to appeal against conviction refused; the sentence application was abandoned.

• Crown Court at Cardiff: the applicant was convicted of conspiracy to defraud on 17 December 2015 and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment on 29 January 2016.