Abnett & Anor, R v

A logical inconsistency between jury verdicts does not, by itself, make a conviction unsafe. The appellant must show that the verdicts are so irreconcilable that no reasonable jury, properly applying its mind to the evidence, could have reached them.

The safety of the conviction depends on the facts and circumstances of the case. A separate-count direction, strong evidence supporting the conviction, and a comprehensible human explanation for an acquittal on another count may mean that the conviction remains safe, even where the acquittal is legally illogical.

The appellants were tried at the Central Criminal Court before His Honour Judge Cooke QC and a jury. They were convicted on 26 November 2015 of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importing amphetamine, a class B drug. They were acquitted of an equivalent count concerning ecstasy, a class A drug, found within one of the same boxes.

The judge directed the jury to consider each count and each defendant separately. He also directed that the prosecution had to prove knowledge of controlled drugs, but not knowledge of the particular type or class of drug.

Both appellants appealed against conviction. The common issue was whether the logically inconsistent verdicts rendered the convictions unsafe.

1. Appeals dismissed. The convictions for fraudulent evasion of the prohibition on importing amphetamine were safe.

2. The court applied the approach confirmed in Fanning [2016] 2 Cr.App.R 19 and derived from Durante (1972) 56 Cr.App.R 708. Logical inconsistency between verdicts does not automatically require a conviction to be quashed. The question is whether the inconsistency is such that no reasonable jury properly considering the facts could have returned the conviction.

3. The verdicts were legally illogical because the prosecution alleged one importation, the factual case did not differentiate between the amphetamine and ecstasy, and proof of knowledge of controlled drugs was sufficient on both counts. Nevertheless, the judge had properly directed the jury to consider the counts separately.

4. There was a powerful case that each appellant knowingly participated in the importation of controlled drugs. The jury could safely have been sure of that in relation to the amphetamine count. Although it would not have accorded strictly with the legal directions, the jury may have treated the ecstasy as a small additional element of the load or taken account of the evidence that the goods were thought to be illicit but to be “puff”. That supplied a comprehensible human explanation for the acquittal, consistent with the reasoning illustrated by Segal [1976] Crim LR 324.

5. The legal inconsistency lay, if anywhere, in the acquittal on the ecstasy count. It did not undermine the safety of the convictions on count 1.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Appeals against conviction dismissed. The court held that the count 1 convictions were safe despite the inconsistent acquittals on count 2.
• Central Criminal Court: The appellants were convicted by a jury on 26 November 2015 of being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of a prohibition on importing amphetamine, and acquitted of the corresponding ecstasy count.