Chapman, R v

Adverse publicity does not itself require a jury to be discharged. The trial judge must decide whether, with clear and firm directions, the jury can still determine the case fairly on the evidence. In making that assessment, the court may consider whether the publicity bears directly upon the defendant or the central issue, the timing of the publicity, and whether there is any reason to doubt that the jury will obey directions.

Applying R v Abu Hamza [2007] QB 659, the court held that generalised public comments about corruption in a country did not determine whether the defendant had made particular payments corruptly. A prompt and unequivocal direction reduced any risk of prejudice to a minimum.

The applicant was convicted at the Crown Court at Southwark of four corruption offences contrary to section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. He received concurrent sentences of 30 months’ imprisonment. The jury acquitted him on two earlier counts but convicted him by majority on four later counts.

While the jury were deliberating, widely reported remarks by the Prime Minister described Nigeria as one of the world’s most corrupt countries. The trial judge refused the defence application to discharge the jury and directed them firmly to disregard the remarks and decide the case solely on the evidence. The applicant renewed his application for permission to appeal against conviction after it had been refused by the single judge. The central issue was whether the publicity made the convictions unsafe.

1. The renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction was refused. The convictions were not unsafe.

2. The court applied the principle in R v Abu Hamza [2007] QB 659. Prejudicial publicity can make a fair trial more difficult, but it does not require the trial to stop if the judge concludes that, with appropriate assistance and directions, the jury can fairly try the case. The judge may rely on judicial experience that juries ordinarily perform their duties responsibly and obey directions.

3. The trial judge had correctly identified a risk of prejudice arising from the timing and extensive reporting of the Prime Minister’s remarks. However, the remarks did not concern the applicant personally and did not determine the central issue. The issue was whether the prosecution had proved that the applicant made particular payments corruptly, rather than whether corruption was widespread in Nigeria.

4. The direction was clear, firm and specifically required the jury to ignore the remarks and decide the case on the evidence alone. There was no basis for doubting that the jury complied. The mixed verdicts also indicated that the jury assessed the evidence separately on each count rather than adopting a broad-brush approach.

5. The judge was therefore entitled to conclude that the risk of prejudice had been eliminated, or at least reduced to an absolute minimum. The application was refused. Lord Justice Davis additionally granted permission for the judgment to be cited.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) — The renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction was refused. The court held that the trial judge’s directions adequately addressed the risk created by adverse publicity.
• Single judge — Permission to appeal against conviction was refused on the papers.
• Crown Court at Southwark — The applicant was convicted of four offences under section 1 of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and sentenced to concurrent terms of 30 months’ imprisonment.