Mills & Ors, R. v

A sentencing court must assess culpability for causing or allowing the death of a child or vulnerable adult by reference to all the circumstances. A conviction for allowing death is not necessarily less culpable than one for causing it. The nature of the offender’s relationship with the victim and the breach of duty are both relevant, without predetermined priority.

Members of a household owe a positive duty to protect vulnerable people under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. Active steps that prevent medical assistance, and a serious attempt to conceal the death or protect the perpetrator, materially aggravate sentence and may justify consecutive punishment.

The Solicitor General referred the sentences of Julie Mills, Barry Imray and Nicole Lawrence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 as allegedly unduly lenient.

Each offender had been convicted of causing or allowing the death of Lee Irving, a highly vulnerable adult, contrary to section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004. They had also been convicted of offences of perverting the course of justice arising from efforts to conceal his death and protect the principal assailant.

The Crown Court sentenced Mills to eight years in total, Imray to three years, and Lawrence to four years. The central issue was whether those sentences properly reflected each offender’s individual culpability and the seriousness of the attempted cover-up.

1. The references were allowed in part. The court increased the sentences imposed on Mills and Lawrence. It held that Imray’s total sentence, although lenient, was not unduly lenient.

2. A section 5 offence under the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 may be as serious as the gravest manslaughter. Culpability depends on all the circumstances. The relationship with the victim and the nature of the breach of duty are both relevant, but neither has necessary priority. Nor is allowing a vulnerable adult to die inherently less culpable than causing the death.

3. The offenders had not voluntarily assumed a professional or familial caring role, but Parliament had imposed a positive duty on household members to protect vulnerable people. Mills and Lawrence knew of the victim’s prolonged and serious suffering. Their conduct went beyond failing to obtain help: each actively helped prevent medical intervention and later joined efforts to conceal the death. Disability hostility under section 146 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 was not established as an aggravating feature.

4. The court approved the sentencing considerations summarised in R v Tunney [2006] EWCA Crim 2066: the seriousness of the substantive offence, the persistence of the perverting conduct, and its effect on the course of justice. Mills’ leading household role, sedation of the victim, and instigation of the concealment conspiracy justified eight years for the section 5 offence and two consecutive years for conspiracy, making ten years. Lawrence’s lesser culpability nevertheless justified five years for the section 5 offence and two consecutive years for perverting the course of justice, making seven years.

5. Imray’s vulnerability, possible learning disability, fear of Wheatley, and lower culpability were matters the trial judge was particularly well placed to assess. The court therefore left his three-year total unchanged.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On the Solicitor General’s reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court held the sentences of Mills and Lawrence to be unduly lenient and increased them. It held that Imray’s sentence was lenient but not unduly lenient.

• Crown Court: On 2 December 2016, Mills received eight years in total, Imray three years, and Lawrence four years.