Director of Public Prosecutions v Woods

A magistrates’ court may revisit a decision to vacate a trial where the decision was materially influenced by misleading or incorrect information. Under Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, Part 3.6, an application to vary a direction made without a hearing must be made promptly and with reasonable notice.

Where the prosecution’s own failures caused the need to vacate the trial and the subsequent de-w通知ing of witnesses, it may still be reasonable to reverse the decision. The court must assess the whole factual context, including whether the prosecution had served its evidence in time, complied with case-management orders and explained the witness’s unavailability.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by Case Stated against a decision of the Burnley Magistrates’ Court. A delegated prosecution decision had vacated the respondent’s trial because an expert witness was unavailable. The District Judge later revisited and reversed that decision after learning that the prosecution’s application had materially mischaracterised the history of disclosure and witness requirements.

The prosecution argued that the District Judge could not reasonably reverse the decision without accounting for the fact that prosecution witnesses had already been de-warned. The central questions were whether the decision could be revisited after misleading information had been provided and whether the reversal was reasonable.

1. Power to revisit. It was common ground that a magistrates’ court may revisit a decision to vacate a trial where it has been materially misled. The court held that Criminal Procedure Rules 2015, Part 3.6 also applied because the original direction had been made without a hearing. The defence applied promptly after receiving the reasons and gave appropriate notice.
2. Materially misleading application. The prosecution’s application wrongly suggested that the expert witness had not been required when the trial date was fixed and placed responsibility for the late application on the defence. In reality, the defence had identified from an early stage that the expert’s evidence was disputed and required his attendance. The prosecution had served the relevant forensic report only shortly before trial and had failed to comply with earlier orders to serve its case and evidence.
3. Reasonableness of reversal. The District Judge was entitled to conclude that the original decision had been substantially caused by that mischaracterisation. The defence was ready for trial despite the late service of the expert evidence. Reconsideration and reversal were not unreasonable, let alone irrational.
4. De-warned witnesses. The District Judge had taken account of the fact that the prosecution witnesses had been de-warned. That circumstance did not make the reversal unreasonable because the difficulty resulted from the prosecution’s own conduct, including its late application and failure to explain the expert’s unavailability. The appeal was dismissed. The defendant’s costs were ordered out of Central Funds, subject to taxation.

• High Court (Administrative Court): allowed the appeal by Case Stated to be considered, but answered the stated question in the affirmative and dismissed the prosecution’s appeal against the District Judge’s decision.
• Burnley Magistrates’ Court: the District Judge revisited and reversed a delegated decision vacating the respondent’s trial, and declined to adjourn it.