Grant, R (On the Application Of) v South Yorkshire Constabulary

When deciding whether a prohibited dog should be destroyed, the court must consider the statutory factors together and ask whether it is satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety. The assessment includes the dog’s temperament and past behaviour, whether the person in charge is fit and proper, and any other relevant circumstances. The court must also consider whether a suspended destruction order or suitable control conditions would adequately protect the public. Where a lower court has given a fully reasoned judgment containing the relevant findings and reasoning, judicial review may proceed directly against that decision without requiring a case to be stated. The appropriate course is the one involving the least expense, delay and duplication.

The claimant sought judicial review after the Crown Court at Sheffield refused to state a case concerning the destruction of her pit bull terrier. Permission had been granted on the limited issue whether the Crown Court had properly applied Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, section 4(1A) and section 4(1B). The Crown Court had considered the claimant’s fitness in the wider circumstances, including her children, the dog’s absence, its breed and the presence of another person whom it regarded as unfit.

The central issue was whether the Crown Court had continued to ask whether, taking the statutory considerations as a whole, it was satisfied that the dog would not constitute a danger to public safety, and what procedural course should follow.

1. Statutory assessment. The principles in R v Flack [2008] 2 Cr App R (S) 70, applied in R v Baballa [2011] 1 Cr App R (S) 50, applied equally to a case under section 4 of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. The court must consider the dog’s temperament and past behaviour, whether the person in charge is fit and proper, and any other relevant circumstances.
2. The statutory factors must be considered together in answering the fundamental question whether the dog would constitute a danger to public safety. A court should ordinarily consider a suspended destruction order and appropriate control measures before ordering immediate destruction.
3. The Crown Court’s reasons arguably failed to show that it had continued to ask the statutory question after considering the factors. That raised an arguable question of law within the permission granted by Holman J.
4. Procedural course. The guidance in Sunworld Ltd v Hammersmith & Fulham London Borough Council [2000] 1 WLR 2102 favoured direct judicial review of the decision where the lower court had given a fully reasoned judgment containing the necessary findings and reasoning. There was no need for the additional administrative step of requiring a case to be stated.
5. Because the interested party was absent and had not acknowledged service, the court did not finally determine the substantive judicial review. The claim was directed to proceed on the permitted ground. The claimant was ordered to file and serve amended grounds and a statement of facts and grounds within 14 days, with standard directions and a two-hour listing.

The judgment records that Holman J had previously granted permission on a limited ground concerning the application of section 4(1A) and section 4(1B) of the Dangerous Dogs Act 1991. This judgment directed the judicial review to proceed directly against the Crown Court’s decision rather than requiring a case to be stated.