FF v KF

On an appeal from a discretionary financial remedy decision, an appellant must show that the discretion miscarried by an error of principle, reliance on irrelevant matters, failure to consider relevant matters, or inadequate reasoning. Financial remedy cases apply the principles of sharing and needs in parallel, with the higher resulting figure governing the award. The needs principle is a term of art and permits a broad, fact-sensitive assessment, particularly after a short marriage. There is no rule that a short marriage requires income provision for a term of years. The court may take account of wealth, the length of the relationship, age, health and marital standard of living. An award may provide for an outright property purchase and a term-of-years income fund without discount for accelerated receipt where that falls within the legitimate discretionary bracket.

The husband appealed against financial remedy judgments made by His Honour Judge Wallwork on 30 August 2016 and 29 March 2017. The parties had a long relationship interrupted by separation, but their marriage lasted less than two years. The husband had substantial pre-marital wealth. The wife had serious psychological injury and uncertain future earning capacity.

The judge awarded the wife a clean-break lump sum of £4.25 million, including provision for property, debts, other capital needs and a ten-year income fund. The husband argued that the judge had gone beyond needs and had augmented the award by unspecified factors. The central issue was whether the judge’s discretionary assessment was wrong in principle.

1. Appeal dismissed. Under FPR 30.12(3)(a), the High Court could allow the appeal only if the decision below was wrong. Where the decision involved discretion and the factual findings were not challenged, wrongness required a demonstrated miscarriage of discretion. That could arise from failure to apply binding authority, an error of principle, consideration of irrelevant matters, failure to consider relevant matters, or inadequate reasoning.
2. The references in the first-instance judgments to a holistic assessment and to the award being based largely, but not wholly, on needs did not establish an error of principle. Since Miller v Miller [2006] UKHL 24, the principles of sharing and needs are applied in parallel, with the higher figure governing the result. There was no warrant for augmenting that higher figure by unspecified additional factors. Properly analysed, the award was based on needs alone.
3. The needs principle involved an almost unbounded discretion. Except in cases of real hardship, needs ordinarily had to be causally related to the marriage. The principal drivers were the payer’s wealth, the length of the marriage, the applicant’s age and health, and the marital standard of living, although the standard of living could not dominate the assessment.
4. There was no rule or guideline that a short marriage required income provision for a term of years. Lifelong support could be awarded after a short marriage, as illustrated by C v C [1997] 2 FLR 26. The judge’s decision to provide a ten-year income fund was therefore permissible. The wife’s property, other capital needs, multiplier and absence of a discount for accelerated receipt all fell within the legitimate discretionary bracket.
5. The court also addressed the private and anonymised nature of the appeal. Appeals from the Family Court were ordinarily heard in private under FPR 27.10. The reporting and anonymity principles discussed in Appleton v News Group Newspapers Ltd [2015] EWHC 2689 (Fam) supported the decision not to identify the parties.

• High Court (Family Division): Appeal against the judgments of His Honour Judge Wallwork dated 30 August 2016 and 29 March 2017 dismissed.