Willers v Joyce & Anor Re: Gubay, Deceased

Statements of case must contain the essential facts relied upon and must be concise. They should not ordinarily become evidence or a narrative account of the dispute. However, compliance with CPR 16.4(1)(a) allows a margin of appreciation. The court should not strike out a pleading merely because it could have been drafted more neatly or narrowly. A party may plead a wider factual case where that case is relevant to a pleaded issue, even if some material may later prove unnecessary. Case management remains available to control disclosure, witness evidence and judicial resources. Overlapping claims arising from different causes of action are permissible, subject to avoiding double recovery.

The claimant sought damages from the executors of the estate of Albert Gubay for malicious prosecution and, alternatively, abuse of process. The claim arose from proceedings brought by Langstone Leisure Ltd against the claimant, which were discontinued shortly before trial. The defendants applied under CPR 3.4(2) to strike out substantial parts of the re-re-amended particulars of claim, and alternatively sought summary judgment on certain heads of loss. They argued that the pleading was irrelevant, excessively broad and included evidence, and that some loss claims were time-barred or abusive because of overlap with proceedings in the Isle of Man. The central issues were the proper degree of concision required in pleadings, the use of strike-out and case-management powers, and the effect of overlapping claims.

1. Application dismissed. The challenged parts of the re-re-amended particulars of claim were not struck out, and summary judgment was not entered.
2. CPR 16.4(1)(a) requires a concise statement of the facts relied upon. Particulars of claim should ordinarily state the essential facts needed to establish the cause of action and should distinguish those facts from evidence likely to be used at trial. Pleadings should not be used to tell the whole story or operate as a first draft of a witness statement.
3. That requirement is not an inflexible red line. The claimant is entitled to identify the factual basis on which the claim is advanced, and there is a margin of appreciation concerning what constitutes the essential facts. The court should not dictate the precise manner in which a party pleads its case or strike out material merely because it is untidy, wider than strictly necessary or includes some extraneous evidence.
4. The claimant was entitled, at this stage, to plead control extending beyond Langstone to the wider trust and group structure because that wider control was relied upon in relation to prosecution, reasonable and probable cause and malice. The court would instead exercise rigorous case management over disclosure and witness statements.
5. The claim for injury to health was not statute-barred. The relevant cause of action arose when the Langstone proceedings were discontinued in the claimant’s favour, and the present proceedings were commenced within a year. The overlapping employment-loss claim in the Isle of Man did not constitute an abuse because it arose from contract, whereas the present claim arose in tort. Double recovery remained prohibited.
6. The defendants’ application was oppressive in character, though not itself an abuse of process, given their earlier opportunities to raise substantially similar complaints and the delay caused by the application. Consequential case-management and trial directions were to be considered at hand-down.

• Supreme Court: On 20 July 2016, the appeal from the earlier strike-out decision was allowed and the order striking out the malicious-prosecution claim was set aside. The whole claim was permitted to proceed to trial.
• High Court (Chancery Division): The present application to strike out further pleaded material, or alternatively obtain summary judgment on specified loss claims, was dismissed.