Knight, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Transport & Ors

Under art 23 of the Salvage Convention, the two-year limitation period begins when the salvage operations giving rise to the claim are terminated. Whether termination has occurred is a question of fact, assessed in all the circumstances. Historic-wreck operations are not necessarily continuous merely because further recovery is intended. Separate operations may arise after a period of inactivity. Once property has been rescued from danger at sea and taken to safety, subsequent preservation work ashore does not extend the salvage operation. A salvage claim may also be refused under art 18 for fraud or other dishonest conduct connected with the salvage services or claim, but procedural fairness requires precise notice of the allegation and an opportunity to respond.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Receiver of Wreck’s refusal to pay salvage awards for cannon, ingots and other wreck recovered from historic vessels. The claim concerned recoveries reported in 2011, including items recovered between 2008 and 2010. The defendants relied principally on art 23 of the Salvage Convention, contending that the claims were brought out of time. The claimant argued that operations on a wreck continued until all recoverable property was raised or he abandoned the work.

The central issues were when the relevant salvage operations terminated, whether the claims were time-barred, and, if not, whether the Receiver had lawfully relied on art 18, statutory forfeiture, public policy and procedural fairness.

1. Disposition. The claim for judicial review was dismissed because the salvage claims were time-barred under art 23 of the Salvage Convention (paras 49, 51, 64).
2. Meaning of termination. Article 23 applies to an action relating to payment under the Convention. The limitation period starts on the day when the activities undertaken to assist the property in danger, and giving rise to the claim, have terminated. Termination is a question of fact, determined in the circumstances of each case (paras 24–31).
3. Historic-wreck operations do not, as a matter of law, continue merely because the salvor intends to return or further artefacts remain to be recovered. A substantial operation may end after one diving season, with later activity constituting a separate operation. Relevant considerations include inactivity, the departure of specialist equipment, the absence of protection or indicators of continuing possession, and the coherence, co-ordination and planning of the operations (paras 28–30, 37–38, 44).
4. Salvage of the cannon ended in 2008, when the recovery operation ceased. The later preservation work ashore did not continue the salvage services because the cannon had already been rescued from danger in navigable waters. The ingot operations ended no later than the relevant 2010 diving season, and the miscellaneous recoveries no later than 2011. Proceedings instituted on 2 September 2016 were therefore out of time (paras 33–50).
5. Alternative grounds. Article 18 permits deprivation of salvage for fault or neglect making the operations necessary or more difficult, or for fraud or other dishonest conduct. The latter need not occur during the salvage operations, but must have a real connection with the salvage services or the claim. The Receiver accepted that fairness required precise identification of the alleged fraud or dishonesty and an opportunity to respond. Any decision to deprive a salvor of all rather than part of the award would also require consideration of reasonableness and proportionality (paras 53–58).
6. Section 236 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 imposes mandatory forfeiture of a non-owner’s salvage claim on conviction for failing, without reasonable excuse, to report wreck. Offences taken into consideration are not convictions for that purpose. The remaining grounds, including the First Protocol issue and the alleged unpublished policy, were unnecessary or not made out (paras 55–63).