Roshan v Singh & Ors

Fresh proceedings by a non-party to impeach an earlier judgment for fraud are not barred as a matter of principle. They remain subject to stringent safeguards. The claimant must show evidence that could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence, is material to the earlier decision, and is so strong that it would probably be decisive at a rehearing. Fraud evidence must be clear and convincing. The court must also conduct a close, merits-based abuse-of-process assessment, considering private unfairness and the public interest in finality and the integrity of the administration of justice. A claim may be struck out where the claimant had a fair opportunity to advance the case earlier and seeks to relitigate a previously determined issue.

The claimant brought representative proceedings concerning the beneficial ownership of property used as a Sikh temple. He sought declarations that the property was held on charitable trust and orders setting aside an earlier county court judgment determining ownership and a later order for sale.

The second and third defendants applied for summary judgment and strike-out under CPR 24.2 and CPR 3.4(2)(b). The claimant relied on alleged fraud in the earlier proceedings and fresh evidence from himself and other members of the temple. The central issues were whether a non-party could seek to set aside a judgment for fraud, whether the proceedings were abusive, and whether they had a realistic prospect of success.

1. Disposition. The claim was struck out as an abuse of process and, alternatively, because it had no real prospect of success. It was not struck out on limitation or laches grounds.
2. Proper claimant. A claim asserting that property was held on trust for an unincorporated association should properly have been brought by its trustees. That defect might potentially have been cured, but amendment or a stay was inappropriate because the claim failed on other grounds.
3. Non-party fraud challenge. There was no principle that only a party to the earlier proceedings could seek to set aside a judgment obtained by fraud. A non-party with a genuine proprietary interest might do so in an exceptional case, subject to stringent safeguards.
4. Fresh evidence. The evidence had to be unavailable at the earlier trial and unobtainable with reasonable diligence; it had to be so material that it would probably have affected the result; and it had to be so strong that it would reasonably be expected to be decisive at a rehearing. Materiality was assessed by reference to the impact on the evidence supporting the original decision, not by reference to what might result from a retrial on honest evidence. The evidence also had to be clear and convincing.
5. Application. The claimant’s evidence could have been obtained and presented at the ownership trial. The principal witnesses knew that ownership was in issue but remained silent, and their explanations were not credible. Even without the reasonable-diligence requirement, the evidence did not establish a credible case of fraud or show that it would have changed the original decision.
6. Abuse of process. The court adopted a close, merits-based analysis directed to private unfairness and the public interest in avoiding repeated litigation and bringing the administration of justice into disrepute. The claimant had ample opportunity to advance the case earlier but waited through subsequent proceedings and sought to reopen ownership on evidence lacking credibility. Continuation of the claim was therefore abusive.

First-instance decision. The judgment describes earlier county court ownership proceedings and a subsequent TOLATA claim, but no appeal from those decisions is stated.