Daryanani v Ramnani

Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 makes serious harm an essential element of a defamatory claim. A claimant must provide particulars explaining the nature of the harm caused or likely to be caused by the words complained of. The court may infer serious harm from the gravity of an allegation or the extent of publication, but that inference is inappropriate where publication was limited, confidential and added little to what recipients already knew. Harm must be attributable to the words sued upon, rather than to separate events such as removal from office or wider community reaction. A bare allegation of serious harm is insufficient where the pleaded and available facts cannot support it.

The claimant, a trustee of a Hindu charity, brought claims in slander and libel arising from remarks made at a private trustees’ meeting and the subsequent circulation of the meeting minutes to the attending trustees and the Charity Commission. He sought to rely on allegations that he had raised unsupported accusations, increased the trustees’ workload and sent hostile personal communications.

The defendant applied to strike out the claim, contending that the publications could not have caused serious harm and that the communications were protected by qualified privilege. The claimant also sought to amend his case to plead republication. The central issues were whether serious harm was adequately established and whether the proposed republication case was sufficiently particularised.

1. Serious harm. Section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013 introduced serious harm as a necessary element of the definition of defamatory. A claimant must do more than insert a bare assertion into the pleading; the nature of the harm caused or likely to be caused must be identified.
2. The court may infer serious harm without evidence where the inherent gravity of the allegation or the scale of publication supports that inference. This was not such a case. The minutes were circulated only to trustees already aware of the allegations and to the Charity Commission, which had requested them. The material added little to the trustees’ existing knowledge and was supplied after they had decided to remove the claimant.
3. Evidence that the claimant had been shunned or avoided did not establish serious harm because it was not linked to the words complained of. Any curiosity or speculation arising from his removal as trustee concerned a separate matter and could not establish harm caused by the publications sued upon.
4. The defendant also had an arguable qualified privilege defence. There was no present indication that the claimant could overcome it by proving malice, namely knowledge of falsity or an improper motive. The point provided an additional possible ground for halting the action, although it did not require determination.
5. The proposed republication amendments were wholly unparticularised. A causative link between the defendant’s publication and any later republication had to be identified. The confidentiality reminder given to the trustees provided no basis for inferring authorisation, intention or a significant risk of republication. The amendments also did nothing to overcome the failure to show serious harm.
6. The claim was struck out.