Okon v The London Borough of Lewisham

On an appeal from a Valuation Tribunal on a question of law, the High Court does not rehear factual issues. Intervention is justified only where the tribunal’s conclusion is perverse, in the sense that no reasonable tribunal could have reached it on the evidence.

A tribunal may assess documentary evidence, draw adverse inferences from unexplained deficiencies, and take account of a party’s failure to give oral evidence. A later tribunal is not bound by an earlier decision concerning different property or issues, but may take that decision into account where the evidence and approach are materially similar. The procedural rules permit the tribunal to admit evidence which would not be admissible in a civil trial.

The appellant brought three appeals against separate decisions of the Valuation Tribunal for England concerning liability for council tax at 298 Southend Lane, 298A Southend Lane and 18 Hillbrow Road.

The disputes concerned whether properties had been genuinely let to particular tenants, whether 18 Hillbrow Road was occupied by the appellant as her sole or main residence, and whether the properties were houses in multiple occupation. The appellant also challenged the conduct of the tribunal hearing, the refusal of an adjournment, reliance on an earlier tribunal decision, and the tribunal’s factual conclusions.

The appeals were heard together. The central issues were whether there had been an error of law and whether the tribunal’s findings were perverse.

1. Outcome. All three appeals were dismissed.

2. The statutory right of appeal was confined to questions of law. A complaint about tribunal conduct may amount to an error of law where the tribunal has ceased to exercise its judicial function, but the threshold is very high. On the evidence, the complaint concerning the questioning of the respondent’s witness was unsupported by a transcript or witness statement. Even accepting the appellant’s account, the questioning was not inappropriate. Any change in the witness’s evidence was a matter for the tribunal to assess, and the tribunal did not rely on that evidence in its decision.

3. The tribunal was entitled to place the burden of proof on the appellant, consistently with Irving Brown and Daughter v Smith (Valuation Officer). Refusal of an adjournment was a matter within the tribunal’s procedural discretion, and thirteen days was not an unrealistic period in which to consider the respondent’s papers.

4. Where the issue before the tribunal is factual, the High Court may intervene only if the decision is perverse or plainly perverse. It is irrelevant that the High Court might have reached a different conclusion. The tribunal had ample material to reject the alleged tenancies at both Southend Lane properties, including inconsistencies in tenancy dates, unsatisfactory evidence of rent payments, similarities in the alleged tenants’ names and signatures, and the appellant’s failure to give oral evidence.

5. Issue estoppel or res judicata applies to tribunal decisions only where there is close alignment between the parties and the factual or legal issues determined. The second panel was not bound by the first panel’s decision because it concerned a separate hereditament and a different or allegedly different tenant. However, under regulation 17 of the applicable procedural regulations, it was entitled to take the earlier panel’s conclusions into account and adopt a consistent approach to materially similar evidence.

6. In relation to 18 Hillbrow Road, the tribunal was entitled to find that the appellant remained resident there. The evidence also supported the conclusion that the property was in multiple occupation, including overlapping tenancies and evidence inconsistent with exclusive occupation by a single tenant. The resulting council tax liability therefore followed under section 6 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 or Class C of the Council Tax (Liability for Owners) Regulations 1992.

• Valuation Tribunal for England: Separate decisions found the appellant liable for council tax in respect of the three properties.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The three appeals were heard together and dismissed. The tribunal decisions were upheld.