Caretech Community Services Ltd v Oakden & Ors

Service is an objective question. The court considers what was done, not what either party subjectively intended. A claim form supplied expressly for information, rather than for service, cannot ordinarily be retrospectively validated under CPR r. 6.15(2), even if its contents came to the defendant’s attention.

Where the claim form and its contents did come to the defendant’s attention, rule 6.15(2) is capable in principle of validating steps affected by errors both as to method and place. The court must still ask whether there is good reason in all the circumstances. The relevant focus is why valid service could not be effected within the claim form’s validity period. The absence of prejudice and the cost of re-issuing are insufficient by themselves.

The claimant sought retrospective validation under CPR r. 6.15(2) of documents sent by post and email to solicitors advising the third defendant. Those solicitors were not authorised to accept service. The postal document was a photocopy, and the accompanying letter stated that the claim form and particulars of claim were supplied for information.

At an earlier trial, the court rejected evidence that a process server had served the third defendant or her home address and set aside a default judgment. The claim form’s four-month validity period had expired. The application therefore raised the scope of rule 6.15(2), the relevance of the distinction between non-service and mis-service, whether defects of method and place could coexist, and whether there was good reason to validate the steps taken.

1. Service is objective. The court adopted the approach in Asia Pacific (HK) Ltd v Hanjin Shipping Co Ltd: the issue is what was done and said objectively. The ordinary features of service are delivery into the recipient’s possession or control, or steps taken under the rules to cause that delivery.
2. A party may make clear that a claim form is supplied for information only. In that event it must be taken at its word. The letter accompanying the documents had that effect. The documents were therefore not steps capable in principle of being validated as service under rule 6.15(2).
3. The distinction between “non-service” and “mis-service” was not a useful basis for defining the court’s power. Rule 6.15(2) could in principle validate steps where defects existed both in the method and the place of delivery, provided the claim form and its contents had come to the defendant’s attention and the steps were objectively taken for service rather than solely for information.
4. Those requirements were necessary but not sufficient. The court had to ask whether, in all the circumstances, there was good reason to make the order. Relevant considerations included why service could not be effected within the validity period, the parties’ conduct, prejudice, the availability of re-issue, and the fact that a limitation bar was absent. No single factor, including knowledge of the claim or absence of prejudice, was decisive.
5. There was no good reason here. The claimant knew that service was disputed while the claim form remained valid and could easily have served it correctly. The process server’s failure was legally the claimant’s failure, although the process server’s dishonesty was not attributed to the claimant. Re-issue costs and delay were consequences of the claimant’s failure to serve in time.
6. The application under CPR r. 6.15(2) was dismissed. The court did not need to decide whether the rule involved a separate two-stage process after a finding of good reason.