Leckhampton Green Land Action Group Ltd), R (On the Application Of) v Tewkesbury Borough Council

In a challenge to planning permission, an officer’s report must fairly inform an experienced planning committee of the material issues. It need not determine those issues or reproduce every relevant document. Where listed-building harm is identified, Planning (Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990, section 66(1), requires the decision-maker to give appropriate weight to preservation. Paragraph 134 of the NPPF operates as a freestanding balance and is not infused with the paragraph 14 tilted balance favouring sustainable development. A permission need not be referred back to committee because of a later material consideration unless that consideration might realistically have changed the decision. For environmental impact assessment, separate developments remain separate projects unless they are functionally interdependent or form an integral part of one development.

The claimant sought judicial review of Tewkesbury Borough Council’s decision to grant permission for 377 dwellings at the Farm Lane site, forming part of the proposed South Cheltenham/Leckhampton strategic allocation. The challenge alleged failures concerning listed-building settings, the NPPF presumption in favour of sustainable development, later preliminary findings of the inspector examining the Joint Core Strategy, and the scope of the environmental assessment.

Permission had been granted on delegated authority after the planning committee resolved in principle to approve the proposal. The claimant renewed permission to pursue the environmental-impact ground. The issues were whether the council’s report and decision applied the statutory and policy heritage tests, whether the later inspector’s findings required reconsideration by the committee, and whether the Farm Lane proposal was part of a larger EIA project.

1. Grounds 2 and 3. The officers’ report properly advised the committee on the effect of listed-building harm. Section 66(1) required a tilted balance in favour of preserving the setting of listed buildings, and paragraph 134 of the NPPF supplied a separate balance against the public benefits. The report’s reference to benefits outweighing harm did not amount to an unweighted exercise. The report had to be read as a whole and addressed paragraph 134 before the overall paragraph 14 balance. The committee was not required to record its own conclusions in the report or for the report to spell out every consequence of its advice.
2. The two exceptions in paragraph 14 of the NPPF are alternatives. If paragraph 134 indicates that development should be restricted, the paragraph 14 presumption is disapplied. If it does not, the paragraph 14 tilted balance applies. Grounds 2 and 3 were rejected.
3. Ground 1. Under section 70(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, a new consideration arising after an in-principle resolution requires reconsideration only if it might realistically have affected the outcome. The later inspector’s preliminary findings were provisional, concerned the strategic soundness of the emerging plan, and were based on landscape sensitivity without the detailed application material before the committee. They could not rationally have changed the committee’s assessment. The application therefore did not need to be referred back.
4. Ground 4. The Farm Lane development was capable of proceeding independently of the remainder of the A6 allocation and was not functionally interdependent with it. It was therefore a separate EIA project. The environmental statement addressed cumulative effects, and the council was entitled to rely on its officers’ appraisal rather than require committee members to read the entire environmental information.
5. The renewed application for permission on ground 4 was refused. The claim on grounds 1 to 3 was dismissed, the injunction was discharged, and permission to appeal was refused.

First-instance judicial review. The judgment records that Lewis J had previously granted permission on grounds 1 to 3 and refused permission on the additional environmental-impact ground. The renewed application for permission on ground 4 was refused, and the substantive claim on grounds 1 to 3 was dismissed.