Ghadami v Bloomfield & Ors

A judge may vary or reverse a decision at any time before the consequential order is sealed. That power must be exercised judicially and in accordance with the overriding objective. It does not require exceptional circumstances, but finality, proportionality and the proper allocation of court resources remain important considerations.

A party cannot use the jurisdiction to re-argue points, deploy material previously available, or pursue speculative evidence which does not establish a real prospect of success. Persistent applications that are totally without merit may justify an Extended Civil Restraint Order. An interim injunction restraining repeated registration of unilateral notices may be granted where there is a serious issue to be tried and damages are inadequate.

The claimant had brought proceedings concerning alleged promises relating to four properties and alleged conspiracy and other economic torts against numerous defendants. The claims against most defendants had been struck out or summarily disposed of. The claimant applied to reopen or vary an earlier judgment, to relitigate the application, to amend his Particulars of Claim, and to bring contempt proceedings.

The court also considered applications for a Civil Restraint Order, costs, and an injunction restraining further unilateral notices against registered titles. The central issues were whether the earlier decision should be revisited, whether the claimant’s applications were totally without merit, and what protective and costs orders were appropriate.

1. Barrell jurisdiction. The court retained power under CPR 40.2(2)(b) to vary or reverse its decision before the consequential order was sealed. Following Re L-B (Children) (Care proceedings: power to revise judgment) [2013] UKSC 8, the power had to be exercised judicially rather than capriciously. It did not require exceptional circumstances. The overriding objective required attention to finality, proportionality, the fair allocation of court resources and the parties’ duty to assist the court.
2. The claimant’s second application failed. It sought to re-argue matters already considered, relied on material that had been available earlier, and advanced speculative inferences which did not establish a real prospect of success. The court declined to revoke or vary the earlier judgment and held that the application was totally without merit and an abuse of the jurisdiction. The third application was stayed and not to be listed.
3. The applications for contempt and amendment were dismissed or refused. The claims against the relevant defendants remained struck out, no proper draft amended pleading had been produced, and the proposed amendments could not overcome the procedural and substantive deficiencies identified by the court.
4. An Extended Civil Restraint Order was appropriate. The claimant had persistently made applications totally without merit. Persistence had quantitative and qualitative elements, and six such findings by four judges, together with the repeated consumption of disproportionate court resources, satisfied the test. The order restrained further related claims or applications without permission, subject to specified exceptions.
5. Applying Nugent v Nugent [2015] Ch 121, and the approach in American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] AC 396 and Nottingham Building Society v Eurodynamics Systems plc [1993] FSR 468, the court granted an interim injunction restraining further unilateral notices. There was a serious issue to be tried, damages were unlikely to be adequate, and the balance of convenience favoured protection of the registered proprietors. They were required to give advance notice of intended disposals.
6. The claimant was ordered to pay substantial costs. Costs for several defendants were to be assessed on the indemnity basis, with payments on account. The injunction costs were reserved. The claimant’s applications were dismissed or refused as specified in the final order.

The judgment records earlier decisions in the same litigation, including the Master’s strike-out order and the judgments at [2016] EWHC 2521, [2016] EWHC 1448 and [2017] EWHC 1282. This court dismissed the application to reopen or vary the earlier judgment and refused permission to appeal.