Singh v Weayou

In a libel claim, a defendant relying on truth must prove that the defamatory imputation is substantially true. A publication alleging sexual harassment and victimisation constitutes statements of fact where it asserts historical events, rather than opinion. Qualified privilege does not protect a complaint made with malice, meaning knowledge of falsity, absence of belief in truth, or recklessness as to truth.

Serious harm is assessed as a question of fact, having regard to the gravity of the allegations, the scale and nature of publication, the likelihood of further dissemination and the vulnerability of the claimant’s reputation. Malicious falsehood requires proof of malice and pecuniary loss. Where the evidence establishes knowing falsity, reputational damage and financial loss, damages and a restraint on further publication may be ordered.

The claimant, a senior psychiatric nursing professional, sued his former colleague for libel and malicious falsehood arising from an email sent to hospital managers. The email alleged that the claimant had made repeated sexual advances, touched the defendant sexually and sought to force him out of employment after his advances were rejected.

The defendant admitted publication and the defamatory meaning, but relied on truth, honest opinion and qualified privilege. The claimant denied the allegations and contended that they were fabricated in retaliation for workplace disputes. The court therefore had to determine the truth of the allegations, the defendant’s state of mind, serious harm, pecuniary loss and the appropriate relief.

1. Judgment for the claimant. The court found that the defendant was not a credible historian. His account contained inconsistencies, new allegations emerged in oral evidence, and aspects of his account were contradicted by documents and witnesses. The claimant’s evidence was consistent and supported by the surrounding evidence.
2. The defence of truth under Defamation Act 2013, section 2, failed. The defendant had not established that the allegations of sexual harassment and victimisation were substantially true.
3. The words complained of were statements of fact, not statements of opinion. A complaint to a hospital manager could have attracted qualified privilege, but the privilege was defeated because the defendant knew the allegations were false and published them maliciously. Malice included knowledge that the information was false, absence of belief in its truth, or recklessness as to its truth.
4. The publication caused serious harm under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013. The relevant circumstances included the gravity of allegations of sexual misconduct against a senior healthcare professional, the close-knit hospital environment, the likelihood of gossip and further dissemination, and the claimant’s existing professional reputation and personal vulnerability to the allegations.
5. The alternative defence of honest opinion under section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013 failed because the statements were factual. The claim in malicious falsehood also succeeded: the publication was malicious and the claimant proved pecuniary loss comprising medication costs and lost overtime earnings.
6. The claimant was awarded £15,000 general damages, £5,000 aggravated damages and £5,531.10 special damages, together with interest as ordered. An injunction restraining further publication of the same or similar false and defamatory allegations was granted for five years.