London Borough of Croydon v Dodsworth & Ors

An interim injunction restraining publication may be continued where the claimant is likely to establish that the information is confidential and that its publication should not be allowed. Under Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(3), the court must be satisfied of that likelihood before restraining publication before trial. It must also give particular regard to freedom of expression under section 12(4), including public availability, the public interest in publication and any relevant privacy code. A general public interest in the proper running of a school does not justify disclosure of confidential information by persons who are not entitled to make it. The order should preserve legitimate disclosure of information already in the public domain and permit applications for variation or discharge.

The claimant local authority sought continuation of an injunction restraining three defendants from using or disclosing confidential information concerning children and staff at one of its schools. The first defendant, a former headmistress, had forwarded work emails and documents to the second defendant, an educational advocate, who had raised safeguarding concerns and indicated an intention to contact the press. An earlier without-notice injunction had been granted and was due to expire.

The second defendant relied on various statutory provisions and human-rights instruments, while accepting that she could not disclose the confidential information. The central issues were whether the claimant was likely to establish that publication should not be allowed and how the right to freedom of expression affected continuation of the injunction.

1. Continuation of injunction. The injunction was continued. The claimant was likely to establish that publication of the confidential information should not be allowed within the meaning of Human Rights Act 1998, section 12(3).
2. The information had the necessary quality of confidence. It included photographs of children. It had been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of confidence. The first defendant owed that obligation to her employer, and the second and third defendants were doubtless aware of it. Unauthorised use or disclosure had been threatened.
3. The provisions relied upon by the second defendant did not authorise public disclosure of the confidential information. Signed consent forms obtained from some parents did not extend to making information about their children public.
4. Under section 12(4) of the Human Rights Act 1998, the court gave particular regard to freedom of expression. The information was not, and was not about to become, available to the public. Publication by these defendants would not be in the public interest, and no relevant privacy code had been identified. The material was not claimed to be, and did not appear to be, journalistic material.
5. There was a public interest in the proper running of the school and in the claimant fulfilling its responsibilities. That interest might justify persons entitled to do so, such as parents, disclosing some information to appropriate authorities or more widely. It did not justify disclosure by these defendants of the confidential information restrained by the order.
6. The order preserved disclosure of information that came into the public domain and allowed the parties to apply for variation or discharge if uncertainties or difficulties arose.

This was a first-instance application for continuation of an injunction. The judgment does not state any appellate history.