Johnson, R (on the application of) v Bristol Crown Court

A fact-finding court’s reasons need not address every piece of evidence. They must explain sufficiently why the losing party lost, deal with any significant strand of the defence, and identify the reasoning on the central issue. An appellate court will rarely interfere with a finding based on the weight of the evidence unless the conclusion is perverse. Case management, including directing an advocate to focus or limit cross-examination, does not of itself establish apparent bias. The relevant question is whether there was a real risk of apparent bias assessed by the objective observer. Alleged violations of Articles 6 and 8 which add no independent basis to the grounds of challenge cannot succeed separately.

The claimant sought permission to challenge the decision of Bristol Crown Court, sitting at Taunton, which had dismissed his appeal against his conviction by magistrates for battery. The renewed application followed refusal of permission by William Davis J.

The proposed challenge alleged that the conviction was against the weight of the evidence, that the hearing involved procedural impropriety, that the Crown Court’s non-contemporaneous reasons were defective, and that the proceedings violated Articles 6 and 8. The central issues were whether the reasons were legally sufficient, whether the decision was perverse, and whether the conduct of the hearing created a real risk of apparent bias.

The renewed application for permission was dismissed.

1. The reasons were formally valid. The fact that the circuit judge drafted the reasons did not show that they were not the judgment of the whole bench. The use of language resembling jury directions was also unobjectionable.
2. The applicable question was whether the losing party knew sufficiently why they had lost. A judgment need not address every matter or evidential detail. It must deal with the central dispute and any significant strand of the defence. The Crown Court had addressed the central issue, namely whether the claimant had bitten the complainant, and had explained why it preferred the complainant’s account.
3. The complaints about inconsistencies, motive, reaction, expert evidence and credibility had been considered in the context of the central incident. Any infelicities or matters which could have been expressed more clearly did not undermine the adequacy of the reasons.
4. The challenge based on weight of evidence disclosed no arguable perversity. The fact-finding court was entitled to reach its conclusion unless it flew in the face of reason. The high threshold for appellate interference was not met.
5. Case management could properly include directing counsel to focus cross-examination or limiting its duration. The interruption complained of did not cause any material unfairness. Applying the approach in R v Gough, there was no real risk of apparent bias to the informed objective observer.
6. The Article 6 and Article 8 complaints were parasitic upon the other grounds and had no independent force. No tenable ground existed for quashing the Crown Court’s decision.

1. High Court (Administrative Court): permission to challenge the Bristol Crown Court decision was renewed after refusal by William Davis J and dismissed by Langstaff J.
2. Bristol Crown Court: on 24 June 2016, dismissed the claimant’s appeal against his magistrates’ court conviction for battery; reasons were given on 5 July 2016.
3. Magistrates’ Court: convicted the claimant of battery on 11 February 2016.