Grasso v Naik (twenty-one irregular divorces)

Decrees obtained through deception concerning a party’s address and the court’s jurisdiction may be set aside as void, and the underlying petitions dismissed. The use of a false address remains deceptive even where the purpose is to conceal an address. Where no answer is filed to a Queen’s Proctor’s plea, the court may proceed on the plea without requiring further evidence from the Queen’s Proctor. The court may set aside decrees nisi, decrees absolute and related certificates. Under section 8 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the person responsible for the deception may be ordered to pay the Queen’s Proctor’s costs on the indemnity basis.

The Queen’s Proctor intervened in twenty-one divorce and civil-partnership petitions. The petitions had been issued between 2006 and 2015. In some cases no decree had been pronounced; in others decree nisi, certificates and decree absolute had been granted.

The Queen’s Proctor alleged that the proceedings had been procured by deception, principally through the use of false addresses at 73 or 75 West End Road, Southall. The alleged architect, a disbarred former barrister, was joined as a third party. No party filed an answer to the Queen’s Proctor’s plea. The central issue was whether the proceedings and decrees had been tainted by deception and what consequential orders should follow.

1. The court found that the Queen’s Proctor had proved the case in relation to all twenty-one petitions. The proceedings were tainted by deception concerning the address of a petitioner or respondent. The false address was not excused by an alleged desire to conceal an address, because other lawful procedures were available for that purpose.

2. Following the approach identified in Rapisarda v Colladon [2014] EWFC 35, decrees obtained by deception were liable to be treated as void and set aside, irrespective of subsequent remarriage or the birth of a child. The court also applied the rule in Clutterbuck v Clutterbuck and Reynolds (1961) 105 SJ 1012, under which a Queen’s Proctor’s plea does not require evidence where no answer is filed.

3. The expert handwriting evidence provided strong support for the conclusion that the third party had completed documents and, in some cases, signatures. The court accepted that evidence. The individual evidence concerning a false address and an apparently forged signature in one petition reinforced the wider finding.

4. The petitions in Part A were dismissed. In Part B, the decrees nisi and certificates were set aside and the petitions dismissed. In Part C, the decrees absolute, decrees nisi and certificates were set aside and the petitions dismissed.

5. Pursuant to section 8 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the third party was ordered to pay the Queen’s Proctor’s costs in all the petitions on the indemnity basis. There were otherwise no orders for costs between the petitioners and respondents. A reporting direction was made under section 1(4) of the Judicial Proceedings (Regulation of Reports) Act 1926.