Director of Public Prosecutions v Patterson

On a submission of no case to answer, magistrates must determine whether the prosecution evidence could support the necessary findings. They must not finally assess the weight or credibility of evidence at that stage. A witness’s personal opinion on whether the defendant was dishonest is generally irrelevant to the ultimate issue, particularly where the witness lacks full knowledge of the facts.

The judgment also recorded the Supreme Court’s rejection in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd of the second limb of the criminal dishonesty test in R v Ghosh. Those observations were obiter, but indicated the approach likely to be adopted by the Court of Appeal.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated against the magistrates’ dismissal of two theft charges against Vicky Patterson. The charges concerned two £140 rent payments which, on the prosecution case, had been received by the respondent but not passed to her employer.

The magistrates found no case to answer, relying on the employer’s doubts about the respondent’s dishonesty, the respondent’s requests for bank details and her expressed willingness to repay. The central issues were whether the magistrates had prematurely evaluated the evidence and whether the material disclosed a prima facie case on dishonesty and intention permanently to deprive.

1. Appeal allowed. The answer to the question posed by the case stated was negative. The case was remitted to be heard by a fresh bench.
2. At the close of the prosecution case, the magistrates were required to ask whether there was evidence upon which they could properly convict. Their reasons were expressed in terms of finality, stating that the prosecution had failed to establish dishonesty and the relevant intention. Their reference to the weight attributed to particular evidence showed that they had conducted a final evaluation rather than deciding whether there was a case to answer.
3. The employer’s views about the respondent’s honesty were irrelevant to the ultimate issue. He did not know whether the money had been lost or stolen and lacked full knowledge of the facts. His opinion could arguably have been inadmissible and, in any event, could not replace the magistrates’ assessment of the whole evidential picture.
4. The court noted the then-binding position under R v Ghosh, under which dishonesty involved both an objective assessment by ordinary reasonable and honest people and a further question whether the defendant appreciated that assessment. It also recorded the unanimous Supreme Court reasoning in Ivey v Genting Casinos (UK) Ltd that the second limb did not correctly represent the law. Those observations were obiter, so the court did not decide the point. The judgment stated that the Court of Appeal could depart from R v Ghosh, relying on R v Gould.
5. There was nevertheless plainly a case to answer. The court declined to elaborate on the merits because the matter had to be reheard by a fresh bench.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated was allowed and the matter was remitted to a fresh bench.
• Magistrates’ court: The magistrates sitting at Great Yarmouth dismissed two theft charges on the basis that there was no case to answer.