Stevens v The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)

The refusal of an adjournment following late disclosure is reviewable as an exercise of discretion. An appellate court will intervene only where no reasonable tribunal could have reached that decision. Delay may be remedied during the trial where all relevant and admissible material is available and the trial remains fair.

The defence of duress requires strict application of an objective standard. The court must consider the accused’s belief in the threatened harm and whether a reasonable person with only legally relevant characteristics would have responded in the same way. Personal vulnerability and a history of domestic abuse cannot automatically be added to the objective test.

The appellant appealed by way of case stated against convictions by Ealing Magistrates’ Court for driving while disqualified, driving with excess alcohol, failing to stop, driving uninsured and dangerous driving.

She admitted the driving but relied on duress, alleging that her abusive partner had threatened and assaulted her while she was driving. The magistrates accepted much of the history of abuse but refused an adjournment after late disclosure and rejected the defence of duress.

The Divisional Court considered whether the refusal of an adjournment was Wednesbury unreasonable and whether the magistrates had erred in applying the test in R v Bowen [1996] 2 Cr App R 157.

1. Disclosure and adjournment. The prosecution’s disclosure had not been conducted properly or in a timely manner. However, the defect was remedied during the proceedings by late disclosure and admissions concerning the history of violence. The proper sanction for delay was not to allow an appeal where the findings of guilt were based on all relevant and admissible material.
2. The grant or refusal of an adjournment was an exercise of discretion. The court would interfere only if no reasonable tribunal could have reached the decision made. The magistrates were entitled to conclude that the trial could proceed fairly. The first question was therefore answered “No”. R v Swash [2009] EWHC 803 (Admin) was distinguishable because, in that case, the disclosure failure concerned credibility and meant that the outcome might well have been different. Here, the delay had been remedied and the appellant’s principal factual contentions had been accepted.
3. Duress. The test in R v Bowen [1996] 2 Cr App R 157 was well established and required strict application of an objective criterion of reasonableness. Characteristics such as pliability, vulnerability or susceptibility to threats could not simply be attributed to the reasonable person. Relevant characteristics could include age and, potentially, sex, pregnancy, serious physical disability, or a recognised mental illness or psychiatric condition. Self-induced intoxication was irrelevant.
4. The magistrates had found that the appellant acted because of the threats and violence, thereby addressing the subjective aspect of the defence. They then considered whether a reasonable woman of her age would have responded in the same way. Although they also considered her personal history of domestic abuse, that gave her a more favourable test than required by R v Bowen [1996] 2 Cr App R 157. There was no evidence of a recognised medical condition of the kind considered in R v GAC [2013] EWCA Crim 1472.
5. Any error in the magistrates’ application of the law operated in the appellant’s favour and did not cause detriment. The second question was amended accordingly and answered “No”. The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated was dismissed. Both questions were answered in the negative.
• Ealing Magistrates’ Court: The appellant was convicted after trial on five driving-related offences and the defence of duress was rejected.