Chambers v Rooney & Anor

An extension of time to appeal should be refused where the proposed appeal has no arguable basis and granting more time would serve no practical purpose. Striking out or summarily determining unsustainable heads of claim may protect litigants in person from unnecessary trial preparation and adverse costs exposure. For defamation claims, the limitation period runs from accrual of the cause of action. Section 32A of the Limitation Act 1980 does not postpone accrual; it permits the court, in appropriate circumstances, to allow a claim to proceed despite expiry of the one-year period. A claimant’s failure to act promptly after discovering the facts is relevant. General allegations do not avoid a limitation bar where the defamatory statements have not been identified.

Mrs Beverley Chambers sought an extension of time to appeal parts of an order made by Her Honour Judge Walden-Smith in the County Court at Central London on 17 October 2016, giving effect to her judgment of 25 July 2016. The underlying proceedings concerned allegations about the administration of Mrs Chambers’s mother’s estate by an executor and solicitor.

The County Court had struck out or summarily determined various heads and sub-heads of claim, including allegations concerning a £500 payment, punitive or exemplary damages, estate property, information costs, estate administration, and defamation. The renewed application required the High Court to decide whether the proposed grounds disclosed any arguable basis for an appeal and, consequently, whether there was any practical value in extending time.

1. The application for an extension of time was refused. The proposed appeal had no arguable basis, so granting an extension would have had no practical value.

2. The striking out of the allegations concerning the £500 payment was correct. The evidence showed that the payment was made by the firm to Ms Wiles personally as compensation for the firm’s failure to answer her letter promptly. It was not an estate expense and disclosed no basis for a claim against the executor. The alternative complaint that the payment should have been made by the estate was also legally unsustainable.

3. The challenge based on the use of the word “client” was misconceived. Read in context, the word was used in a loose sense to describe a beneficiary dealing with the firm in relation to the estate. It did not show that Ms Wiles had independently retained the firm as her professional adviser or establish a conflict of interest.

4. The defamation claims were plainly out of time. Under section 4 A of the Limitation Act 1980, the one-year period ran from accrual of each cause of action, which occurred when the allegedly defamatory statements were made. Section 32A did not postpone accrual. It conferred a discretion to permit proceedings despite expiry of the limitation period, including by considering whether the claimant acted promptly after learning of the relevant facts. The claimant’s substantial delay in identifying the statements gave no realistic prospect of obtaining such permission.

5. Section 35 could not assist because the original claim was itself issued after the one-year limitation period had expired. Section 32 also provided no arguable basis because the material did not support deliberate concealment.

6. The complaints concerning punitive or exemplary damages, estate property, information costs, and alleged failures in estate administration disclosed no realistic prospect of success. The claim for punitive or exemplary damages did not plead the necessary allegation that conduct had been calculated to produce a profit exceeding the compensation payable.

7. The court also endorsed the practical value of early disposal of legally or factually unsustainable claims, particularly for litigants in person, while stressing the need to stand back objectively and concentrate resources on claims with a real prospect of success.

1. High Court (Queen's Bench Division): the renewed application for an extension of time to appeal was refused because the proposed appeal had no arguable basis.
2. County Court at Central London: Her Honour Judge Walden-Smith’s order dated 17 October 2016 gave effect to her judgment of 25 July 2016, including striking out or summarily determining specified parts of the amended particulars of claim.