Wright v The Parole Board of England and Wales

A parole panel may proceed with a review where a directed psychological assessment has not been completed, provided it has sufficient evidence to make a proper risk determination and the prisoner has a fair opportunity to address the evidence. Procedural fairness depends on the circumstances, including the importance of the issues and the evidence available at the hearing. The assessment of risk is primarily for the Parole Board. The court will intervene only where relevant evidence has been ignored, irrelevant matters considered, or the procedure has denied a fair hearing. A formal diagnosis of psychopathy is not essential if the Board assesses the risks arising from relevant personality traits and the available evidence. Judicial review was refused.

The claimant challenged the Parole Board’s decision of 17 February 2017 refusing to direct his release from custody. The Board had previously adjourned his review to obtain a full psychological risk assessment addressing personality disorder, psychopathy and risk of violence. The reports ultimately obtained did not provide the requested comprehensive assessment. At the adjourned hearing, however, the psychologists gave evidence, the panel included a psychologist member, and the Board concluded that the available evidence demonstrated a high risk of sexual and violent offending.

Permission to seek judicial review was granted on the arguable ground that the Board should have adjourned again pending the requested assessment. The central issue was whether proceeding with the hearing rendered the refusal of release procedurally unfair.

1. The application was refused. The Board’s decision not to adjourn the third review hearing again was lawful and did not cause unfairness.
2. Procedural fairness is context-dependent. The Board was required to ensure a fair hearing, particularly because liberty was at stake, but it was essentially for the Board to determine its own procedures. The court applied the approach in R (on the application of Mierek Weszka v The Parole Board [2012] EWHC 827 (Admin) and Simplex GE (Holdings) Ltd. v Secretary of State for the Environment [1988] 3 PLR.
3. The claimant did not have to show that the omitted evidence would probably have changed the outcome. The issue was whether the same decision was inevitable, assessed in the context of the hearing.
4. The Board was entitled to proceed where all three psychologists were present, evidence was given about risk, and the panel included a psychologist member. It was for the Board to decide whether the evidence was sufficient. The court would be slow to interfere with the Board’s risk assessment where it had considered relevant evidence and avoided irrelevant considerations.
5. A formal diagnosis was not required. The Board could rely on observed personality traits, expert evidence, the index offences and the custodial history. The claimant was represented and able to challenge the psychologists’ opinions. The decision was therefore procedurally fair.

The judgment determined a first-instance application for judicial review of the Parole Board’s decision dated 17 February 2017. Permission had been granted by Garnham J. on the issue of whether the Board should have adjourned the review again. The application was refused.