The Health And Care Professions Council v Hooijdonk

The court may dispense with service where exceptional circumstances show that service would create a risk of harm substantially beyond the ordinary distress caused by proceedings. A respondent’s previous suicide attempt, continuing suicidal reaction to regulatory communications, psychiatric care and the availability of indirect service may together justify that course.

An interim suspension order may be extended where serious allegations make continued suspension necessary for public protection. The court may grant the maximum period sought where there is a realistic possibility that the substantive hearing will be delayed, go part-heard or require a further hearing, provided the prejudice to the respondent remains limited.

The Health and Care Professions Council applied to extend an interim suspension order against a registered physiotherapist under article 31(8) of the Health and Social Work Professions Order 2001. The respondent faced allegations of financial impropriety involving a patient with brain damage and had been charged with theft, although the criminal proceedings were discontinued. The Council’s fitness-to-practise investigation later found a case to answer, and a substantive hearing had been listed.

The respondent was absent and unrepresented. The issues were whether service could be dispensed with under CPR 6.16 and whether a further 12-month extension of the interim suspension order was appropriate.

1. Service. The court dispensed with service under CPR 6.16. Exceptional circumstances existed because the respondent had previously attempted suicide, had stated that the proceedings made him suicidal, was under psychiatric care, and might suffer harm going substantially beyond the normal shock or upset caused by service. Service on his medical team, with disclosure to him when medically safe, provided an appropriate safeguard.
2. Extension of suspension. The power under article 31(8) of the Health and Social Work Professions Order 2001 was exercised. The allegations were serious, and continued suspension was necessary for public protection pending determination of the charges.
3. Length of extension. Although the hearing was expected within three months, a 12-month extension was justified because the hearing might be delayed, go part-heard or require a further hearing. The respondent’s prejudice was limited, since the latest evidence suggested that his health independently rendered him unfit to practise.
4. An order was made in the terms of the draft, amended to include liberty to apply.

Not stated in the judgment.