Ibidokun, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration detention must remain connected to removal and must last no longer than is reasonable in all the circumstances. The Secretary of State must act with reasonable diligence and expedition. A high risk of absconding is critically important, but it does not automatically justify detention indefinitely or displace the need to assess the total period. Delay in determining an asylum claim may make detention unlawful where it is inadequately explained and materially impedes removal. The court must reach its own judgment on the legality of detention. Conduct in detention is not, without more, evidence of a risk of absconding or offending after release.

The claimant, a Nigerian national, sought judicial review of his detention under immigration powers from 6 August 2016. He alleged that the detention had become unreasonable and that the Secretary of State had failed to act with reasonable diligence and expedition to remove him.

Permission was granted on the limited Ground 1 issues. The claimant’s asylum claim was made in August 2016, interviews concluded in January 2017, and the refusal decision was made in March 2017 but not notified until June 2017. His asylum and human-rights appeal was later dismissed. The central issues were whether the detention was lawful during the relevant periods and whether the delay in determining and notifying the claim was justified.

1. Applicable principles. The burden of justifying detention rested on the Secretary of State. Applying the principles in R v Governor of Durham Prison, ex p Hardial Singh [1984] 1 W.L.R. 704, as summarised and approved in R (I) v SSHD [2003] I.N.L.R. 196 and R (Lumba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 2 UKSC 12, detention must be for removal, must last no longer than a reasonable period, must cease when removal cannot be achieved within a reasonable period, and must be pursued with reasonable diligence and expedition.
2. The court had to reach its own judgment on the scope and lawful exercise of the detention power, rather than merely review the Secretary of State’s assessment. The risk of absconding was of critical and paramount importance, consistently with Fardous v SSHD [2015] EWCA Civ 931, but it did not automatically justify detention regardless of its length.
3. The claimant’s history of evading immigration control, false identity details and repeated failures to report established a high risk of absconding. The risk of harm to the public was relevant but was not itself high. The child abduction notice had limited weight, although it provided some evidential link to the child’s disappearance.
4. Minor altercations, verbal abuse and failures to obey instructions in detention did not materially increase the risks of absconding or offending on release. The position would differ if the detainee had attempted escape or committed serious offences in detention. Mental health was relevant to the reasonableness of detention, but the evidence showed access to healthcare and appropriate measures when risk arose.
5. The Secretary of State failed to act with reasonable diligence and expedition between 14 March and 9 June 2017. The asylum claim had been determined by 14 March, and the explanation for withholding notification until June was tentative and unsupported. Detention during that period was therefore unlawful.
6. Once the refusal was notified, the remaining risks and the absence of barriers to removal meant that continued detention was lawful. The claim was allowed only for the period 14 March to 9 June 2017. A declaration of unlawful detention and damages were granted for that period; the remaining detention was lawful.

The judgment describes prior procedural steps within the judicial-review proceedings. Permission was initially refused on paper by Lang J on 24 June 2017. Warby J granted permission on the limited Ground 1 issues and refused interim relief on 17 August 2017. The claim was then determined at first instance by the Administrative Court. The First-tier Tribunal had separately dismissed the claimant’s asylum, human-rights and humanitarian-protection appeal on 13 November 2017.