Bruma v Hassan & Anor

[2017] EWHC 3209 (QB)

Case details

Case citations
[2017] EWHC 3209 (QB)
Court
High Court (Queen's Bench Division)
Judgment date
18 December 2017
Judgment text

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Subjects
Tort Negligence Contributory negligence
Keywords
road traffic accident pedestrian driver speed failure to keep a proper lookout Highway Code contributory negligence causative potency relative blameworthiness
Outcome
claim succeeded (80% liability to the defendant; 20% contributory negligence)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

A motorist must adapt speed and lookout to the prevailing road, traffic, lighting and weather conditions. The posted speed limit is an absolute maximum, not a target. A driver may be negligent even where a pedestrian has also misjudged the traffic, if a proper lookout and an appropriate speed would probably have avoided the collision. Contributory negligence is assessed by comparing the parties’ relative blameworthiness and the causative potency of their conduct. A pedestrian’s failure to use a nearby crossing and misjudgment of an approaching vehicle may justify a deduction, but the driver’s failure to observe a pedestrian who was visible for several seconds may remain the predominant cause.

Factual background

The claimant suffered catastrophic injuries after being struck while crossing Holloway Road in darkness and light rain. The first defendant was driving north and the claimant was walking across the road towards an Underground station. The issue at trial was liability only.

The court considered whether the defendant had been driving too fast for the conditions or had failed to keep a proper lookout, and whether the claimant’s decision to cross away from a pedestrian crossing and her misjudgment of the defendant’s speed amounted to contributory negligence.

Held

  1. Primary liability. The defendant was travelling at or very close to 30 mph. Although that was within the posted limit, the conditions required a lower speed. The road was wet, it was dark, pedestrians were present and the location was close to an Underground station. The Highway Code provisions relied upon by the court made clear that the speed limit was an absolute maximum and did not make driving at that speed safe irrespective of conditions.
  2. The claimant was probably visible to the defendant for several seconds before he registered her presence. Any obstruction caused by an oncoming vehicle was likely to have been momentary. A reasonably competent driver keeping a proper lookout and travelling at about 20 mph, or even 25 mph, would probably have been able to stop. The defendant therefore fell below the required standard. The claimant established primary liability.
  3. Contributory negligence. The court adopted the approach in Eagle v Chambers [2003] EWCA Civ 1107 of identifying the matters relevant to each party’s causative potency and blameworthiness. The defendant’s conduct included driving at the maximum permitted speed, failing to keep a proper lookout and having the opportunity to take avoiding action. The claimant had unnecessarily crossed a four-lane road, failed to use the pedestrian crossing, misjudged the defendant’s speed, wore dark clothing and continued across the centre line.
  4. Belka v Prosperini [2011] EWCA Civ 623 was distinguishable. The claimant in that case had deliberately run into the path of an approaching taxi, whereas this claimant was walking and had already crossed two lanes. Sabir v Osei Kwabena [2015] EWCA Civ 1213 was considered as a comparison concerning a pedestrian’s misjudgment and a driver’s failure to avoid a collision.
  5. The appropriate apportionment was 80 per cent responsibility to the defendant and 20 per cent contributory negligence to the claimant. The court deferred final consequential orders concerning quantum and other matters pending further submissions or an agreed order.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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