Pannu v Carter & Anor

Slander is not actionable without proof of special damage unless the words fall within a recognised exception. An allegation conveying only reasonable grounds to suspect a criminal offence is insufficient to engage the exception for accusations of imprisonable offences.

A voluntarily supplied communication may attract qualified privilege where there is a legitimate common and corresponding interest between publisher and recipient. The test is objective, and the communication must be proportionate. Qualified privilege may be defeated by express malice, ordinarily requiring proof that the defendant knew the words were false or was reckless as to their truth, or that the dominant motive was to injure the claimant.

The claimant, a taxi driver, sued the defendant in slander over a conversation with a Medway Council employee concerning information that he had been arrested on suspicion of a drugs offence. He also sued in libel over a subsequent email referring the employee to a purported witness.

The defendant denied identifying the claimant or making the alleged allegation. She relied on the absence of actionable slander, qualified privilege and the absence of malice. The Council was joined in Part 20 proceedings concerning an admitted breach of confidence, but those proceedings were not determined in this judgment.

The issues were whether the claimant proved publication and meaning, whether the slander was actionable without special damage, whether the email was defamatory, whether qualified privilege applied, and whether it was defeated by malice.

1. Meaning and publication. The claimant proved that the defendant identified him and conveyed that he had been arrested because of a suspected drugs offence. The natural and ordinary meaning was limited to reasonable grounds to suspect him of a drugs offence, corresponding to “Chase level 2”. The repetition rule treated the report of what another person had said as equivalent to a direct allegation.
2. Actionability of slander. Slander is generally actionable only on proof of special damage. The relevant exception concerns accusations of criminal offences punishable with imprisonment. An allegation of reasonable grounds to suspect such an offence did not satisfy that exception. The claim therefore failed in slander.
3. Email. The email, standing alone, bore no natural and ordinary meaning defamatory of the claimant and was not actionable.
4. Qualified privilege. The defendant and the Council had a legitimate common and corresponding interest in information potentially affecting the claimant’s suitability to provide services, including services involving vulnerable children. A volunteered statement could attract qualified privilege. The communication was proportionate, confidential and no wider than necessary. The test was objective and was not determined by the defendant’s personal belief.
5. Malice. Malice ordinarily required proof of dishonesty or recklessness, namely knowledge of falsity or indifference to truth. Alternatively, where the defendant believed the words true, the claimant had to show that the dominant motive was to injure him. The evidence did not establish either basis. The defendant genuinely believed the information was significant and entitled the Council to investigate it.
6. The claim against the defendant was dismissed. The judgment made no determination of the Part 20 proceedings.