AH v DT

In an internal relocation case, the child’s welfare remains the paramount consideration. The court must evaluate the relocation holistically, including the child’s relationships with both parents, practical consequences and the feasibility of maintaining contact. The same basic principles apply to internal and external relocation; guidance such as the factors identified in Payne v Payne is a checklist, not a prescriptive formula. An appellate court will not interfere with a discretionary welfare decision merely because it might have weighed the factors differently.

The mother removed the child from England to Northern Ireland after stopping the father’s contact, following an allegation of sexual abuse which the trial judge found unproved. The trial judge ordered the child’s return to England and made a staged contact order.

The mother applied to the High Court for permission to appeal, arguing that the judge had failed to apply the welfare principle, had inadequately considered relocation practicalities, alleged risks, proportionality and contact arrangements, and had proceeded without an updated welfare report. The central issues were whether the first-instance decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural irregularity, and whether there was a real prospect of a successful appeal.

Permission to appeal refused. An appeal in a family case is not a rehearing. It succeeds only if the decision was wrong or unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity. Permission requires a real prospect of success or another compelling reason.

1. The trial judge had kept the child’s welfare paramount and considered the relevant welfare factors, including the advantages of remaining in Northern Ireland and the practical difficulties of returning to England. He was entitled to treat the child’s close and valuable relationship with her father, and the feasibility of regular contact, as the factor of magnetic importance.
2. The decision did not punish the mother or prioritise the father’s convenience. It resulted from a welfare balancing exercise in which restoring frequent contact outweighed the disadvantages of returning the child to England.
3. The trial judge was entitled to proceed without an updated welfare report because no party had sought one at the hearing. Nor was the decision undermined by allegations of recent threats where no findings had been requested.
4. Although the judgment lacked a detailed separate proportionality analysis, its reasoning was consistent with Article 8. A fuller analysis would not have added materially.
5. The staged progression from supervised to unsupervised and overnight contact fell within the trial judge’s discretion, given the positive contact evidence and absence of findings of risk. A further application remained available if problems arose.

The child was directed to return to Kent by 4 pm on 12 December 2016. The existing child arrangements order otherwise remained in force, subject to amended contact dates.

1. High Court (Family Division): permission to appeal against the order of HH Judge Scarratt dated 15 September 2016 was refused. The return and contact arrangements were re-dated following the stay.