A Local Authority v X, Y and Z (Permission to Withdraw)

Permission to withdraw care proceedings must be granted where the local authority cannot establish the threshold under Children Act 1989, s 31(2). Allegations that a parent holds extremist views or has engaged in terrorism-related activity do not, without evidence of harm or a risk of significant harm to the child, establish the threshold. Findings must be rooted in the empirical evidence and reasonable inferences, not assumptions or speculation. Each family must be assessed on its own circumstances. Where the threshold could be established, the court must consider whether fact-finding is necessary and proportionate before applying the child-welfare test.

The local authority sought permission to withdraw care proceedings concerning three children. The proceedings arose from allegations concerning the parents’ extremist beliefs, the father’s criminal convictions and his TPIM, and alleged exposure of the children to radicalising material or views. The application was supported by all parties.

The principal issue was whether the local authority was plainly unable to establish the threshold under s 31(2) of the Children Act 1989, so that withdrawal had to be permitted, or whether the threshold could be established, requiring consideration of fact-finding and the children’s welfare.

1. Permission granted. The local authority was unable to satisfy the threshold criteria under s 31(2) of the Children Act 1989. Permission to withdraw the care proceedings was therefore granted.
2. The court accepted that serious findings could potentially be made about the parents’ conduct, including findings consistent with the father’s convictions and the findings in Secretary of State for the Home Department v LG, IM and JM [2017] EWHC 1529 (Admin). Those matters were not, however, determinative of harm to the children.
3. The evidence from the social worker, specialist assessor and Children’s Guardian showed no radicalisation of the children and no exposure to extremist material. The children presented as well balanced, engaged in education and outside activities, and had not suffered significant harm.
4. The risk of significant harm had to be established by evidence. It could not be inferred merely from the parents’ alleged beliefs, associations or conduct. Findings under Part IV of the Children Act 1989 had to be rooted in the totality of the empirical evidence and reasonable inferences. The local authority had to link the facts relied upon to the particular type of significant harm alleged, as emphasised in Re A [2015] EWFC 11.
5. Where the threshold might be established, the court should first decide whether a fact-finding exercise was necessary and proportionate, applying the factors identified in A County Council v DP, RS, BS (By the Children’s Guardian) [2005] 2 FLR 1031 and considered in J, A, M and X (Children) [2014] EWHC 4648 (Fam). That question did not arise because the threshold could not be met on the evidence.
6. The court had no jurisdiction to dictate any voluntary work under s 17. Any children-in-need plan should have a clear purpose, responsibilities, agreed actions, review mechanism and timeframe. It could not be used to obtain supervisory powers where a supervision order could not be justified.