Medway Council v Root (1)

An injunction restraining publication of confidential material from family proceedings may continue after those proceedings end and after the child reaches adulthood, where the court has expressly made it continuing and has balanced the rights under articles 8 and 10 of the Convention. A breach of an injunction is established where the prohibited act was deliberate. The applicant need not prove a specific intention to disobey, or a particular motive. The criminal standard of proof applies to committal proceedings. The exception permitting disclosure to pursue a complaint does not authorise repeated public publication of confidential material on social media where that publication defeats the purpose of the injunction.

Medway Council applied to commit Sara Jayne Root for contempt arising from ten Facebook publications concerning care proceedings involving her children. The injunction, made in 2011 and varied in 2012 and 2014, prohibited publication of court papers and confidential information until further order. The 2014 variation permitted disclosure falling within rules 12.73 and 12.75 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010.

The respondent accepted making the publications but argued that the injunction had lapsed, that the publications were permitted while pursuing complaints against the local authority, and that she lacked the necessary guilty intention. The court determined the validity and duration of the injunction, the mental element required for contempt, the scope of the complaint exception, and whether the ten alleged breaches were proved.

1. Burden and standard of proof. The burden lay on Medway Council. Each alleged breach had to be proved to the criminal standard, namely so that the court was sure.
2. Continuing injunction. The injunction was expressly to remain in force until further order. It was made under section 12 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960. The automatic restraints in family proceedings could be relaxed or extended by injunction. The court had to balance the children’s article 8 rights against the respondent’s article 10 rights. The injunction therefore remained effective after the care proceedings ended and after the children reached 18. In any event, the proved breaches occurred before the younger child’s eighteenth birthday.
3. Mental element. Applying the approach in Stancomb v Trowbridge UDC [1910] 2 Ch 190, confirmed in Heatons Transport v TGWU [1973] AC 15 and Director General of Fair Trading v Pioneer Concrete UK Ltd [1995] 1 AC 456, the court held that a deliberate act contrary to the injunction was sufficient. The authority of Irtelli v Squatriti [1993] QB 83 did not require proof of a further intention to disobey. Motive was irrelevant.
4. Complaint exception. Rules 12.73 and 12.75 of the Family Procedure Rules 2010 permitted specified communications, including communications necessary to pursue a complaint. Repeatedly placing confidential family material on Facebook did not constitute pursuing a complaint within rule 12.75. That interpretation was necessary to preserve the purpose of the injunction.
5. Disposition. Ten breaches, occurring between September 2014 and 8 April 2016, were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The respondent’s defences failed. Sentence was adjourned pending determination of alleged breaches of a separate undertaking.

The judgment describes an earlier application for permission to appeal the 24 April 2014 injunction variation. On 28 July 2016, the Court of Appeal, through Macur LJ, refused permission to appeal as totally without merit. The present committal application was determined at first instance by the High Court (Family Division).