London School of Science and Technology, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

A sponsor’s assessment of academic progression is not confined to the sponsor’s own academic judgment. The Secretary of State may conduct a substantive compliance assessment under the sponsorship guidance, subject to ordinary public law controls.

Where several students receive same-level courses without adequate evidence of progression, the Secretary of State may treat the failures as serious or systematic and revoke the Tier 4 licence. A joint licence policy may provide that revocation of Tier 4 also revokes Tier 2, provided the policy leaves a residual discretion for exceptional cases.

The claimant, a private higher-education provider, held joint Tier 2 and Tier 4 sponsor licences. Following a compliance visit, the Secretary of State decided to revoke both licences because of concerns including academic progression, attendance, reporting, sponsor changes and CAS discrepancies.

The claimant sought judicial review, arguing principally that the Secretary of State had unlawfully interfered with academic judgment, acted unfairly by relying on new points, and fettered her discretion by revoking the Tier 2 licence when the Tier 4 licence was revoked.

1. Application refused. The revocation decision was not unlawful.
2. The Secretary of State’s review of academic progression was not limited to irrationality or perversity. The Guidance contemplated substantive scrutiny, reflecting responsibility for immigration control.
3. The eight same-level cases provided a rational basis for finding inadequate assessment of academic progression. The claimant’s systems did not adequately consider progression from incomplete or unrelated courses. The failures could properly be viewed as systemic.
4. Assigning CAS without properly assessing academic progression was capable of constituting a serious breach. Revocation was therefore an available and justified sanction.
5. Procedural fairness required notice of the essence of the concerns and a reasonable opportunity to respond. The March letter had identified the substance of the later concerns, and the claimant had been able to make representations.
6. The joint-licence policy did not unlawfully fetter discretion because a residual discretion for exceptional cases remained. There was no obligation to consider that discretion routinely where no exceptional circumstances were advanced.
7. The remaining matters did not establish public law error. Attendance concerns were not irrational, the reporting breach could be considered cumulatively, and the CAS discrepancy was not shown to be unreasonable. The application was refused.